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Abstract
Most of the studies and research analyzing the private equity ("PE") sector in the Middle East
North Africa ("MENA") region tend to focus more on the Middle East and less on North
Africa. The case of Tunisia is probably the most appealing within the North African region
regarding the transformational phase the industry is going through there. Accordingly, the main
objective of this thesis will be to provide some keys to understand the dynamics of private equity
in Tunisia.
The recent uprising has shown how ardently people are seeking a radical change in the current
political and socio-economic model. Studying the private equity sector in Tunisia whilst balancing
the underlying hurdles and opportunities, is certainly a first step towards understanding a
complex but fundamental issue: how and to what extent can the promotion and the revitalization
of investments in the country's private sector constitute a key lever for the government to meet
the social claim for a sustainable development?
First of all, I believe it is essential to apprehend the backdrop of Tunisian private equity by
analyzing global trends of the private equity industry, the rise of interest in emerging markets as
well as the current macro environment in Tunisia. I will then examine the drivers and
fundamentals of PE investment in Tunisia by analyzing the current framework in place and the
specificities of the private equity lifecycle - from fundraising to exit. Finally, I will endeavor to
investigate the hurdles various stakeholders might face as well as the opportunities they might
enjoy, and I will ultimately highlight some of the options available to overcome obstacles and
take advantage of favorable circumstances.
Thesis Supervisor: S.P. Kothari
Title: Gordon Y Billard Professor of Management, Deputy Dean at MIT Sloan School of
Management
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1. The Backdrop of Tunisian Private Equity
1) What is Private Equity?
Private equity ("PE") is the provision of equity capital by financial investors to private
companies. The private equity community includes independent private equity and venture
capital ("VC") funds as well as merchant banking subsidiaries of large institutions (investment
banks, insurance companies, or even industrial companies).
As displayed in Figure 1.1, a team of private equity professionals typically sets up a fund
partnership and raises money from a number of institutional investors. The management
company owned by the PE professionals is the general partner ("GP") of the fund while the
investors who provide the capital to invest are the limited partners ("LPs"). PE professionals
typically invest the money raised from the LPs in private companies and split the share of profits
with their investors upon liquidation of the fund. According to the industry standard, the GP
usually charges a 2% management fee on the committed capital and a 20% carried interest on
profits made. Once the capital is committed from LPs, PE professionals look for potential targets
and call the capital as they source transactions (the investment period generally lasts 4 to 6 years).
Portfolio companies are held for a period usually ranging from 4 to 7 years during which PE
professionals seek to create value in order to reach an internal rate of return ("IRR") of 20-30%
once they exit the company.
Figur 1.1:
Typical PE Fund Setup in the US
Equity Owne
Gexneral Partner
("GP")
8
400
capital
Contribution
There are several features that distinguish private equity investing from other types of passive
investing'.
- Private equity investment is an active type of investment by nature. Private equity
professionals are typically actively involved in screening investment opportunities,
negotiating and structuring deals once potential targets are identified, monitoring and
guiding portfolio companies. They often hold one or several board seats and actively
advise company on strategic and financial matters.
- Private equity investments have a limited lifetime. The contractual obligation for GPs to
liquidate the fund after a certain number of years (usually 10 to 12 years). Therefore,
private equity investments are not meant to be held indefinitely and all the funds coming
from the sale of portfolio companies are distributed upon the liquidation of the PE fund.
- The securities purchased are generally privately held by a small group of investors (they
are not publicly traded). Even in the rare cases whereby a PE fund invests in a publicly-
held company, the securities purchased are non-public.
- Private equity investments often involve significant risk-taking. The fact that PE investors
seek high returns is related to the significant level of risk involved in typical private equity
investments. They intend indeed to deliver "geometric" returns rather than low-yielding
returns provided for example by senior debt instruments. Financial instruments typically
involved in PE transactions include common stock, convertible preferred stock or
convertible subordinated debt (embedding a conversion feature into common stock),
non-convertible preferred stock or non-convertible subordinated debt accompanied by
"equity-kickers" (warrants), risky debt securities purchased at discount (usually in a
turnaround deal).
- Private equity investors give a great importance to the quality of the management in
portfolio companies. The skills and quality of people managing portfolio companies are
seen as crucial to make high returns possible.
- Private equity investors seek a certain level of control. In case they do not purchase a
controlling stake in the portfolio company, private equity investors typically seek to
guarantee a certain level of control through contractual agreements and board
representation.
- Private equity investments are expensive in terms of cost of capital in the sense that the
equity-type returns sought by PE professionals need to be in line with the level of risk
involved in their investments. Therefore, it is much more expensive for a company to
raise private equity capital rather than traditional debt. In typical cases, the returns
compensating PE investors not only factor in the idiosyncratic risk but also the illiquidity
of the investment and the advisory services.
Experts commonly distinguish several types of private equity investment'.
- Venture Capital: This type of investment targets companies at the early stage of their
corporate cycle. Venture capital professionals typically invest along with entrepreneurs
seeking to start a business. Such start-up transactions can be categorized into seed money
investments (targeting potential businesses still requiring substantial research,
' Jack S. Levin, "Structuring Venture Capital, Private Equity, and Entrepreneurial Transactions", 2010
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development, or other important milestones before starting revenue-generating
operations) and early-stage venture capital (financing start-up companies which are ready
to begin or have recently begun revenue-generating activities).
- Growth Capital: Private equity professionals investing in the growth capital area target
companies with a proven track-record (and most of the time already generating positive
cash flows) but seeking capital to grow and expand their business activity (for example to
develop a new product, build a new plant, expand distribution and market reach, start
operations in a new country, acquire another company, etc.).
- Industry Consolidation: PE professionals can undertake a strategy of industry
consolidation when they identify a fragmented market with a number of relatively small
players and no market leader. In this case, they typically acquire one of the many players
which will act as an industry platform for future roll-ups. Private equity investors then
help the company buyout several players or start operations in markets where there is no
desirable target business (or existing similar businesses) in order to create a national or
regional leader.
- Leveraged Buyout: Private equity professionals operating in the leveraged buyout (or
"LBO") field look for mature companies with very stable and visible cash flows. The
rates of return generated exclusively by growth potential and operating efficiency usually
do not meet private equity targets. In this area of private equity, investors often use
financial engineering by levering up the company in order to take advantage of the
leverage effect (as long as the return on assets is higher than the cost of debt, a high
amount of debt can significantly increase the return on equity).
- Turnaround Investments: This type of investment involves the purchase of securities in a
troubled company which is suffering losses, is over-leveraged, and/or is facing other
financial and business setbacks. Turnaround investors may also purchase a portion of the
troubled company's distressed debt (trading at a high discount) in order to obtain control
of the company in case of bankruptcy or restructuring.
2) What are the Current Global Trends and Dynamics in the Industry?
A) Recovery in Private Equiry Activity after the 2008-2009 Doldrums
The global financial and economic recession severely hit the private equity sector as deal
activity, exits and fundraising faced a dramatic decline in 2008 and 2009, not to mention the
sharp decrease and big balance sheet write-downs of portfolio companies due to an overall drop
in valuation levels. Nevertheless, signs of recovery are clear now as activity picked up in 2010-
2011.
Global Private Equity Deal Activity
After five years of continued growth with a peak in 2006 at almost $700 billion (globally),
private equity deal activity dramatically shrank under the effect of the financial and economic
crisis. Before the crisis hit, the sector experienced a tremendous expansion mainly driven by
cheap financing, strong economic growth, asset price escalation and institutional investors'
10
willingness to allocate a significant amount of funds for PE firms. The sharp reversal experienced
by the credit market in the summer of 2007 entailed a strong rise in risk aversion and a dry-up of
loan securitization, in particular collateralized loan obligations or "CLOs" on which large buyout
firms were dependent to finance leveraged transactions. This important change in the credit
market directly affected the ability if private equity firms to borrow under favorable conditions
and consequently their capacity to generate deals. The climate of economic uncertainty and
poorer performance of portfolio companies has made PE professionals more doubtful about
investment opportunities and focus more on restructuring their existing investments.
However, overall deal activity started picking up again at the end of 2009. With a CAGR of
+91 % over 2010-2011, private equity-backed M&A transactions increased from $71 billion in
2009 (lowest level since 2001) to $258 billion in 2011 (in line with volume levels in 2004-2005)
along with the global economic recovery (Figure 1.1).
Figure 1.1
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Private equity experts agree that the current trends in private equity deal activity is driven by
the factors listed below.
- A huge and aging "dry powder"
At the end of 2009, private equity firms had approximately $1 trillion of dry powder - the
amount of capital committed by LPs to private equity funds but remaining uncalled -, half of
which for buyouts (other categories mainly include real estate, venture capital, distressed PE,
mezzanine)2 . More importantly, the dry powder for many of the PE firms is aging capital needs
to be urgently put to work. As PE funds have typically an investment period of 4 to 6 years and
very high amounts of capital were raised between 2005 and mid-2008 (Figure 1.2), GPs are under
pressure to invest before the investment period expires; otherwise, they would end up losing
management fees associated to invested capital and loose somehow their "credibility".
i1
2 Preqin research reports
Valuation levels higher than expected
This pressure on GPs to invest is important to understand why the deal activity picked up as
soon as the economic environment showed some signs of improvement. However, one of the
perverse effects of this ticking clock is that valuations surprisingly came back to high levels.
According to Bain & Company', strong competition made acquisitions pricey and drove
valuation levels almost up to the levels seen before the crisis (in 2010, on average 8.5x EBITDA
in the US and 9.2x EBITDA in Europe). Most GPs were expecting to pay between 5.Ox and 7.Ox
EBITDA2 . Wary of overpaying, some of them preferred financing and supporting their portfolio
companies rather than purchasing new assets and underestimating downside risks. Therefore, one
might reasonably induce that the rebound in PE deal activity could have been even stronger if
prices were more in line with downside risks related to the uncertainty hanging on global
economic conditions.
- A renewed but still fragile credit market
Leveraged loans suffered from the crisis and decreased from over $700 billion freshly issued
in 2007 to slightly over $100 billion in 2009'. Moreover, the fact that CDOs almost disappeared
(from $1 trillion in 2006-2007 to barely $3 billion in the first semester of 20115) is a key element
to understand the current trend in private equity deal financing.
However, the appetite of credit markets for high-yielding assets significantly increased as the
general level of interest rates is low (due to the expansionary monetary policy undertaken by
central banks). Approximately $100 billion 3 of fresh leveraged loans were issued in 2010 versus
$150 billion only in the first semester of 2011. "Covenant-lite loans" which are popular with
companies owned by private equity firms because of less stringent conditions on the borrowing
company, are now back on the market after 3 years during which almost no "cov-lites" were sold.
The risk appetite of banks for those high-yielding products faces a structural challenge though: as
the regulatory framework is moving towards more prudence regarding banks' balance sheets,
banks are likely to ask for higher returns and drive spreads up in order to make their new model
consistent. The "pickiness" of banks, the collapse of securitization and the availability of cash
among bond investors have significantly increased the recourse to high-yield bonds. Those
securities represented 25% of leveraged financing in 2010 and 2 8% in 2011 whereas their share
was barely above 0% before. The volatility in capital markets makes it periodically difficult for PE
firms to use high yield bonds to finance acquisitions; however, bridge financing is currentdy
flexible enough to allow an opportunistic access to the market.
The renewed access to financing is an important driver of the current PE deal activity. The
overall system has become "healthier" and more risk averse than it used to be before the crisis
(Table 1.1).
3Bain, "Global Private Equity Report", 2011
4 S&P LCD, 2011
s SIFMA, 2011
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Table 1.1'
Leverage
Structure
Minimum Equity Contribution
Repayment
Pricing
Covenants
Syndication
Q2 2007
7.Ox
Senior, Second lien, PIK
20%
All bullet
Senior: Ubor + 2.25%
Second Len: Libor + 4.0*/o
PIK Libor + 9.0%
Leverage only
Up to 100% underwriter
2011/2012
4.0x-5.Ox
Senior / Mezzanine or High yield bond
30-45%
Partly amortized, partly bullet
Senior. Libor + 5.0-6.0%
Mezzanine / High yield: Libor + 10.0-12.0%
Leverage, interest rate coverage, cash-flow
cover, capital expenditure
More than one bank (or club syndicate for
smallerdeals)
Global TInIds in I undrah ising;/<
The fundraising activity of private equity firms also steeply declined over 2007-2009 and
continued to decline in 2010 (capital raised divided by 3 over the three-year period) while it
increased only by 15% in 2011 (Figure 1.2).
Figure 1.2
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As previously developed, private equity funds wield a huge amount of dry powder (slightly
under $1 trillion in 2010) due to the high level of fundraising activity pre-crisis. However, GPs
6 Indicative information provided by a professional during a presentation at the Alternative Investment
Conference at LSE in January 2012
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are currently having difficulties to raise fresh money from LPs (half of PE funds which closed in
2010 and 35% in 2011 have not managed to raise their target amount). Several factors justify the
tightness of the fundraising market.
- Overcrowd in GPs seeking to raise funds
The imbalance between LPs' liquidity shortage and the volume of funds sought by GPs partly
explains why a significant number of GPs were not able to raise their target amount. According
to a study conducted by Preqin, there are currently 1,814 funds on the road seeking to raise an
aggregate value of $744 billion whereas only $262 billion were raised in 2011.
Fige 1.3
Private Equity Funds in Market, 2008-2012
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- Negative impact of dry powder
The large amount of uncalled capital and the currently high valuation levels raise doubts
about opportunities for private equity investments. The c. $1 trillion of capital commitments also
represents a huge overhang for LPs as they will have the contractual obligation to supply GPs
with liquidity once capital calls are triggered.
- Capital allocation impacted by the valuation of other asset classes ("denominator
effect")
As displayed in Figure 1.4, most of private equity capital is committed by institutional
investors.
Preqin, 2011
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Figure 1.4
PE Investment Breakdown by Type of LP in 2010 (%)
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Institutional investors usually allocate their investments in private equity as a proportion of
their total assets under management (pension funds, which account for 42% of capital committed
to PE funds in 2010, allocate for instance on average 6-7% of their assets under management to
private equity"). Consequently, as the overall valuation of the assets was hit by the crisis, the
absolute amount allocated to private equity investments also shrank. The fact that institutional
investors are reluctant to overweight an asset class in their portfolio dramatically reduces the
room for more commitments to private equity GPs.
- Mismatch between calls and distributions
Although PE exits recently picked up, a study conducted by Bain & Company3 shows that
capital calls have surpassed capital distributions since 2007. It is indeed common during the
lifecycle of a private equity fund (that is to say before its liquidation) that GPs distribute part of
the capital to LPs as they exit some of their investments. The fact that capital calls currently
outpace distributions increases the liquidity pressure on LPs.
- GP-LP relationship toughened up
The rate of re-ups by GPs has decreased since 2007, which reflects the fact that LPs are
seeking to invest with top quartile funds and are now favoring quality over quantity. The
increased "pickiness" about proven track record, the more intense and exhaustive due diligence
required, and finally the tougher negotiations on the compensation and the terms of partnerships,
exacerbate the difficulty GPs are facing to raise funds.
According to a survey conducted by Preqin, fundraising is even more difficult for first-time
GPs as almost 40% of interviewed LPs closed their doors to first-time funds. The mix of new
GP relationships expected in 2012 is shown in Figure 1.5.
8 Deutsch Bank Research Report, "Private Equity, Opportunities in Turbulent Times", October 12, 2011
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Figure 1.5
Investors' Intention to Form New GP Relationships in 2012
3% U Entirely Allocated to Re-
10% 16% ups with Existing
Managers
" Mostly Re-ups, some New
GP Relationships
E Mix of Re-ups and New
GP Relationships
2 Mostly New GP
29% Relationships
42%
U Only Investing with New
Managers
Soune: Preqin, 2012
Another indicator of LPs' "pickiness" in committing capital post-2008 is the increase in the
average time taken for funds to close (Figure 1.6). While it took on average one year for fund
managers to close a fund in 2007, they needed on average more than a year and a half to do so in
2010.
Figue 1.6
Average Number of Months Taken for Funds to Achieve a Final Close by Year of
Fund Close
20.0 8.7
18.0 17.6
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Soure: Preqin, 2012
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According to an article posted in "Private Equity Manager"', there is a growing tension
between GPs and LPs over terms in funds' formation, more especially about fee structure.
Quoting the journalist, "as the world crawled out of economic malaise and back into investment
mode, LPs made clear they would no longer accept uniform charges across funds of varying
performance". Typically, the compensation of GPs follows the "2-20" rule: funds' managers
receive 2% of committed capital ("management" fee) and 20% share of the upside
("performance" fee). Such structure can entail a misalignment of interests because of the
significant amount management fees represent (GPs would be less incentivized to deliver high
performance returns). A research conducted by Oliver Gottschalg and Bernd Kreuter shows that
GPs earn on average more than three times in management fees than in carried interest. This
element combined to the current slowdown in PE activity explains why LPs have become more
sensitive to fee structure. According to Bernd Kreuter, head of alternatives at Feri Institutional
Advisors, "there is a risk a GP will be more concerned about their ability to raise a next fund
instead of maximizing returns for their current investors". As a matter of fact, one of the most
preeminent institutional investors, the California Public Employees' Retirement System
("Calpers"), won fee concessions from CIM Group and Apollo Management of $175 million in
20119. Therefore, LPs now tend to toughen their due diligence of fund managers. According to
Bela Schwartz, CFO of The Riverside Company, "more LPs are asking for a firm's budget or
projection of future operational expenses".
Fees charged to portfolio companies are another way for PE firms to generate revenues.
Those fees are mainly composed of "deal" fees (charged to portfolio companies post-transaction)
and "monitoring" fees (paid by portfolio companies to PE owners for their advisory services). A
study conducted by Preqin and Dechert LLP shows that such fees significantly increased in 2009
and 2010 (Figures 1.7 and 1.8). One could reasonably assume that the increased tension with LPs
over compensation has pushed GPs to increase fees charged to their portfolio companies.
Figure 1.7
Average Transaction Fee as Percentage of Deal Size: 2005-2008 vs. 2009-2010
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Soun-e: Preqin & Decbett LLP, 2012
9 htp://www.p uiymanagr.cojm, Nicholas Donato, "Fees Trump Carry in GP Compensation", 20-July-
2011
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Figure 1.8
Average Monitoring Fee as Percentage of EBITDA: 2005-2008 vs. 2009-2010
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- More optimism among LPs
As the activity is recovering, there is currently an overall sentiment of optimism among
investors regarding their commitments in private equity investments. As shown in a survey
conducted by Preqin (Figure 1.9), only 40% of the investors interviewed expected to commit
less capital in 2011 than in 2010.
Figure 1.9
Amount of Capital Committed in 2011 Compared to 2010
12/ 1% mSignificantly More Capital
in 2011 than in 2010
*Slightly More Capital in
11% 2011 thanin 2010
ESame Amount of Capital
in 2011 as in 2010
18%
E Slightly Less Capital in
2011 thanin 2010
17% 0 Significantly Less Capital
in 2011 thanin 2010
E Did not Invest in 2010
but Investingin 2011
27%
Soune: Preqin, 2012
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Moreover, private equity as an asset class has historically delivered higher returns than the
equity and bond markets (Figure 1.10). The industry performed relatively well throughout the
financial and economic crisis. The higher performance of private equity investments is
underpinned by a study conducted by A.T. Kearney in 2011 showing that private equity-owned
firms provide a better top-line performance and turned to be more resilient to the crisis in 2009
(Figure 1.11).
Figure 1.10
Private Equity Returns versus Equity and Bond Returns, as of 31 December2010
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Figure 1.11
Revenue Growth of Private-Equity Owned Companies versus Peer Companies*
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The attractive "alpha" delivered by the industry translates into a high "satisfaction rate"
among LPs (Figure 1. 11). According to a study conducted by Preqin, 63% of investors expect
their private equity returns to be 400 basis points higher than returns in public markets, and a
quarter of them expect a positive difference of 200-400 basis points. This element constitutes a
positive sign regarding future fundraising activity. However, the overall attractive performance
should not hide the difference between top-tier and less performing PE funds and the fact that
LPs are expected to be choosier in their future private equity commitments.
Figure 1.12
LPs' Expectations about their Private Equity Investments, as of 31 December 2011
6%
19%
" Expectations Exceeded
" Expectations Met
" Expectations Not Met
75%
Soun: Preqin, 2012
Although there is a cyclical trend in rates of return delivered by private equity funds (crises
have an adverse impact on returns whereas macroeconomic growth entails high positive returns),
returns generated by vintage year (the year in which the fund is launched), which constitutes a
better indicator to LPs, have proved to be counter-cyclical over time (Figure 1.13)'0. More
precisely, in a period of economic downturn, private equity investments generate higher returns.
This might be due to more scrutiny in investments and lower asset prices. According to Deutsche
Bank, this anti-cyclical correlation is even truer for top-quartile funds. Even though the
overhanging dry powder drives valuation levels up, the current gloomy economic prospects could
paradoxically generate higher returns by vintage year in the future.
0 Deutsch Bank Research Report, "Private Equity, Opportunities in Turbulent Times", 12-October-2011
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Figure 1.13
GDP Growth and Returns on Private Equity Investments by Vintage Year, USA
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B) Shift towards Emerging Markets
R/Se O/ Initeres! l ,/ tetrig A lIarkets
As shown in Figure 1.14, private equity activity in emerging markets ("EM") has strongly
increased since 2004 in terms of funds raised and capital invested:
- Funds raised grew from $7 billion in 2004 to $39 billion in 2011 with three major trends:
a sharp increase from 2004 to 2008 with a peak in 2008 at $67 billion, a strong decrease in
2009-2010 at $23 billion for both years, and finally a significant recovery in 2011 with
total funds raised standing at $39 billion. In terms of percentage of global fundraising,
2011 was historically the strongest year with funds raised targeting emerging markets
peaking at 15% of global funds raised. This element shows the stronger investors'
appetite for private equity investments in emerging markets.
- Private equity capital invested in emerging markets also significantly grew between 2004
and 2008 from $7 billion to $48 billion with a peak in 2007 at $53 billion. Despite the
sharp decrease in 2009 to $22 billion, capital invested in emerging markets as a percentage
of global private equity investments in 2009 was at a historical peak. This fact reflects the
resilience of emerging markets to the global financial and economic crisis as well as the
availability of investment opportunities in such markets.
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Figure 1.14
Private Equity in Emerging Markets: Fundraising and Investments
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As indicated by Figure 1.15, private equity fundraising targeting emerging markets was
primarily captured by (emerging) Asian countries (with China on the front line). The preeminence
of Asian countries has been particularly steady since 2008, with a share of 60% to 71% of total
funds raised in emerging markets. One should also notice that the share of Latin American and
Caribbean countries significantly increased in 2010 and 2011 (respectively 24% and 22% whereas
the arithmetic average from 2002 to 2008 was around 9%). On the other hand, the share of CEE
& CIS and MIENA in EM fundraising post-2008 significantly decreased (respectively 5% and 1%
in 2011). Finally, Sub-Saharan Africa's share was historically low (average of 4/6).
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Breakdown of Private Equity Fundraising among the "Emerging Markets" Group
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Figure 1.16 confirms the dominance of PE activity by Asian countries as their share in total
capital invested by far surpassed other emerging regions (average of 63 % over 2003-2011 with a
peak of 70% in 2011). Emerging Asian countries were followed by LatAm & Caribbean and CEE
& CIS regions (each of them displaying a 2003-2011 average of 12% of the total PE capital
invested in emerging markets). The MENA region and Sub-Saharan Africa captured the smallest
portion of capital investments as they respectively displayed a 2003-2011 average of 5% and 8 %
of total investments while they represented only 1% and 4% in 2011.
Figure 1.16
Breakdown of Private Equity Investments among the "Emerging Markets" Group
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Figure 1.17 compares the different emerging regions on the basis of a ratio defined by funds
invested over funds raised (at a certain year). A ratio superior to 1.0x indicates that the
investment activity is "hotter" than the fundraising activity; on the contrary, a ratio inferior to
1.0x indicates that the fundraising activity is ahead of the investment activity. Several
observations can be made:
- The ratio for the Asian region was the most stable over time and the closest to 1.Ox (the
arithmetic average over 2002-2011 is 1.0x), which means that the investment cycle
parallels the fundraising cycle on average and that investment opportunities justify the
high amounts raised in the region.
- The ratio for Latin America & Caribbean was historically above 1.0x (average of 1.2x over
2002-2011). Nevertheless, the region had the lowest ratio in 2011 (0.4x) due to a buoyant
fundraising activity.
- The ratio for Sub-Saharan Africa was historically far above 1.0x (average of 1.62x over
2002-2011). One could reasonably infer that funds are put to work faster than they are
raised. However, the fact that the ratio fell below 1.0x in 2010 and 2011 suggests that the
dry powder in the region increased. In 2011, capital invested was as low as funds raised
and the ratio dropped close to 1.0x.
- The ratio for the MENA region was constantly below 1.0x from 2002 to 2008: fund
managers in the region increased their dry powder with a "hot" fundraising activity
relatively to capital effectively put to work. Nevertheless, the trend reversed in 2009 and
2010 due to a weaker fundraising activity.
- The ratio for CEE & CIS was quite volatile between 2002 and 2007 but it remained
constantly above the 1.0x threshold from 2008 to 2011 (the highest ratio among the
group in 2011 at 2.0x). This recent trend reflects investors' lower appetite for the region
and funds formerly raised being invested.
Overall, emerging markets have been piling up dry powder as investment activity was lower
than the fundraising activity when looking at the emerging group as a whole. As a matter of fact,
dry powder in emerging markets has increased at a 32% compounded annual rate since 2005"
(compared to 8% in Western Europe and 7 % in the US).
"Bain, "Global Private Equity Report", 2012
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Figure 1.17
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As private equity activity in emerging markets is gaining interest among the LPs community,
it becomes essential to understand the underlying drivers of PE expansion in such markets.
Moreover, this step is important to apprehend Tunisia's positioning in a later stage. In this regard,
the central question should be: which factors, when combined, would trigger private equity deal
flow in emerging markets?
Five building blocks can be seen as essential for the expansion of private equity in an
emerging country12:
a) Availability of Funds
As previously developed, the private equity model is based on a basic GP-LP relationship:
typically, a GP would seek funds from LPs in order to manage them in return for performance
and management fees. Therefore, when funds provided by LPs are scarce, the private equity deal
flow is weak. There are four types of potential LPs for fund managers seeking to raise capital
targeting PE investments in emerging markets:
- Development financial institutions (CDFIs"): This group encompasses international
development organizations whose first objective is to promote private sector investments
in developing countries. Providing PE fund managers with capital to invest is one way for
them to do so. They often play a crucial role in supporting first-time funds in emerging
12 Based on an analysis conducted by the IFC ("Emerging Market Equity: Private Equity, Public Equity, Risks &
Opportunities", World Pensions and Investments Forum 2012, Paris, 9 February 2012) and a report published by the
Boston Consulting Group ("New Markets, New Rules", November 2010)
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markets. Some examples of such institutions are the World Bank's International Finance
Corporation ("IFC"), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
("ERBD"), the Overseas Private Investment Corporation ("OPIC"), the UK's CDC
Group, and Germany's DEG.
- State-owned investment vehicles: Governments can play an essential role in PE
expansion by devoting investment vehicles unlocking funds devoted to private equity. In
this perspective, sovereign wealth funds ("SWFs") are expected to be on the front line
(resources are estimated at $4.7 trillion in 20111"). The accumulation of cash in oil-rich
economies (notably in the Middle-East), the surplus of foreign currency reserves in fast-
growing economies (e.g. China) as well as the willingness of sovereign wealth funds to
invest in alternative assets providing higher returns, should result in a higher inflow of
funds toward PE funds in emerging markets from SWFs. However, while some of these
SWFs aim at a global reach (e.g., Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, Kuwait Investment
Authority), others are more focused in developing the PE sector in their home economies
(e.g. Mubadala Development Company in Abu Dhabi, Temasek Holdings in Singapore)".
- Asset managers: This group is composed of financial institutions which have an asset
management activity and whose main aim is to allocate investments in order to optimize
their overall portfolio (private equity is one asset class in which they invest among
others). Such a group of institutional investors typically includes private and public
pension funds, insurance companies, foundations and universities (endowments).
- High-net-worth individuals: High-net-worth individuals can constitute potential LPs for
PE fund managers in the sense that private equity constitutes one of the asset classes they
would invest in to manage their fortune. However, individual investors are less reliable
than institutional investors due to higher needs in liquidity and generally lower
sophistication in asset management.
There are two main factors explaining global LPs' rise of interest in emerging markets:
portfolio diversification (less exposure to developed markets and de-correlation) and access to
emerging markets' fundamentals (stock markets are usually underdeveloped and do not give
direct access to economic fundamentals). LPs often base their investment allocations on proven
track records: good track records of PE funds in a country or region can sometimes be vital to
sustain fundraising activity.
b) Economic Conditions for Investment Opportunities to Emerge
A market-based economy is essential to attract LPs' interest in private equity investments. As
a matter of fact, entrepreneurial activities typically increase, companies within the range of PE
ticket sizes emerge, private investments expand and "real" economic growth is not artificially
sustained by government interventionism, services and products get more sophisticated while
consumer demand is bolstered, management practices improve enough to be interesting for PE
investments.
Economy openness is also an important factor to be taken into consideration. Less stringent
trade barriers and capital control entail more competitive pressure and push domestic companies
to meet international standards in terms of efficiency. The possibility to expand beyond national
frontiers makes room for potential regional leaders to grow more substantially. The deal flow is
stimulated as companies need more capital to expand offshore, improve operations and become
more efficient, large conglomerates might be faced with the necessity to sell off non-core assets.
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c) Scalability
Scalability is often decisive to attract capital from potential LPs as most PE investments in
emerging markets are categorized as growth-capital private equity. The size of the population and
the economy is a good proxy for the potential market (especially for B2C businesses):
simplistically, small population and economy would cap potential for growth whereas large
population and economy would offer portfolio companies with greater growth prospects. When
the domestic market is limited, the economy needs to be at least open enough to allow potential
regional expansion.
d) Structural Factors
The transparency and the stability of the legal system, investor protection and corporate
governance are critical to measure private equity attractiveness. "Trust" makes it easier for GPs
to raise money from foreign LPs, undermines fears from political and legal risks, gives a greater
value to contractual agreements, and makes the due diligence processes easier.
An attractive fiscal system can provide incentives to domestic investors. The levels of
corporate tax rate as well as the tax on dividends and capital gains are the fundamental elements
defining "tax-attractiveness". From the perspective of foreign LPs, double taxation agreements
are also essential to avoid additional layers of taxation.
The human and social environment is also an important element to consider for LPs as the
cost of doing business in emerging markets is often higher than it is in developed markets. The
flexibility of employment, the level of corruption, the overall level of education, the business
costs of violence and crime are in this regard indicators assessing to some extent the quality of
the human and social environment.
e) Banks and Cap~ital Markets
The quality and sophistication of bank lending and debt capital markets facilitate investments
in lower growth companies. The possibility of leveraged acquisitions can increase deal flow as
slower growth companies become viable targets. However, an easy access to lending and an
overwhelming availability of "bad" credits can distort capital markets and make it more difficult
for PE investors to generate deals.
Stock exchange liquidity can help PE activity thrive as exit windows improve in the sense that
IPOs generally provide better exit multiples. The development of stock markets improves exit
conditions, increases return expectations, and therefore indirectly stimulates private equity deal
flow.
Ke Sass ac}trs fir PE, Firms Operatin in EmeTIng Market
According to a study conducted by BCG (based on a dataset provided by the IFC), there are
several differences between success factors for PE funds investing in developed markets and
those investing in developing countries". Several important inferences can be made:
13 BCG Report, "New Markets, New Rules", November 2010
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Minority deals are more successful than majority deals. Most of the businesses in
emerging markets are still in the early stage of their development. Owners typically want
to keep control of the company that they are still developing. However, clear corporate
governance often helps private equity investors to protect themselves from the lack of
control.
It is better to invest in businesses focusing in domestic markets rather than those
targeting internationally-oriented companies. While there are good arguments for
investments in internationally-oriented companies, the dataset provided by the IFC shows
that companies focusing on their domestic market are on average outperformers. Such
observation might be explained by the expertise and in-depth knowledge managers tend
to have in their domestic market.
It is important to identify industry cycles as some sectors in emerging markets can
significantly outperform others in terms of returns. The IFC dataset shows that
investments in telecommunications, healthcare and materials were clear outperformers.
While the analysis of potential trends in individual sectors is essential for GPs' investment
thesis, sector specialization in emerging markets can be risky since potential uncertainties
can be magnified by a lack of diversification.
First-time funds in emerging markets perform well as they match and sometimes exceed
returns achieved by experienced fund managers. The IFC dataset unexpectedly shows
that first-time managers delivered very decent results since 46% of the top-quartile
performers were first-time funds and first-time fund managers delivered on average
approximately the same performance as experienced GPs.
Funds with a local presence are much better performers than international funds without
any local presence. They delivered returns on average five times higher than funds
without local offices. In this regards, local presence enables fund managers to strengthen
their domestic network and have a better understanding of specific socio-economic
conditions.
Top-line growth is the main driver of strong performance among top-quartile funds. The
IFC dataset suggests that superior returns delivered by top-quartile funds are driven by
revenue growth rather than leverage.
Bigger funds outperform smaller ones according to the IFC dataset. This observation
suggests that bigger funds allow GPs to build stronger ties with local businesses.
However, diseconomies of scale might be triggered if the funds become "too" big
relatively to the absorption capacity of local businesses. Moreover, medium-sized
investments provided better returns on average than small investments: the mid-cap
market in emerging countries seems to have a better risk-return profile than the small-cap
market.
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3) Rationale for Investing m Tunisia: a Top-Down Perspective
A) Macroeconomic Fiundamentals
With 10.5 inhabitants and a gross domestic product ("GDP") of $44 billion in 2010, Tunisia
is a relatively small country. In this regards, Figure 1.18 compares the "size" of the Tunisian
economy to its Middle-Eastern and North African neighbors. The relatively low GDP mirrors
the limited capacity to absorb investments, especially when compared with much bigger
economies such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Egypt or to a lesser extent Algeria and
Morocco. This is notably due to a relatively modest population (which limits the market reach for
investors) but also to a lack of natural resources comparatively to countries such as Saudi Arabia,
UAE or Algeria.
Figure 1.18:
Benchmarking the "Size" of the Tunisian Economy
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However, when Tunisia is compared to its neighbors in terms of GDP at purchasing power
parity per capita (which is often considered as a good proxy of the standard of living), it turns out
that is fairly well positioned (Figure 1.19). It should be noted that the high GDP per capita PPP
in UAE, Saudi Arabia and Libya is significantly biased by the preeminence of natural resources
(essentially oil and gas) in their economies. Moreover, the proactive education policy undertaken
in Tunisia since 1966 significantly decreased the illiteracy rate (people ages 10 and above) from
51% in 1966 to 19% in 201014; the Tunisian population is highly educated relatively to the
region's standards.
However, the relatively high levels of standard of living and literacy rate should not hide the
internal disequilibrium prevalent in Tunisia.
14 IDEES, report on the unemployment in Tunisia, 2012
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- By the end of 2011, the unemployment rate reached 18.9% at the national level and
30.5% for those with university degrees" (with even higher rates in underdeveloped
regions).
- The poverty rate is standing at 25% (share of citizens living with less than 2$ per day)'.
- The disparity between the illiteracy rate in rural regions and urban areas is significant
(respectively 310% and 13%) ".
- The economy is dual with a notable regional disequilibrium and a severe fracture between
coastal regions and inland areas.
While the social and economic instability subsequent to the Tunisian revolution has
exacerbated this internal disequilibrium, it also revealed that it had been already very severe under
the regime of the ex-President Ben Ali.
Figure 1.19:
Benchmarking the Tunisian Standard of Living: GDP per Capita PPP (2010)
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The GDP growth of Tunisia fell in the 5-6% range over 2003-2007 and in the 3-4% range
over 2008-2010 (Figure 1.20). While the growth profile does not seem as attractive as in some
emerging countries displaying GDP growth closer to 10%, the "growth story" remains attractive
compared to developed markets and the economy proved to be relatively resilient to the global
recession (before the uprising in 2011). Nevertheless, the social and economic instability
following the 2011 revolution severely hit the overall economy as the GDP is estimated to have
fallen by 2.2% in 2011. Tourism and the phosphate industry, two key sectors in the Tunisian
economy, were particularly harmed. Despite the drawbacks and internal instability suffered by the
country, the 2012 budget released by the Ministry of Finance remained optimistic about the
growth prospects in 2012 (first set at 4.5% then revised at 3.5%).
1s National Institute of Statistics ("INS")
16 Tunisie Valeurs, "Revue de Recherche", February 2012
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The country's current account deficit was also negatively impacted by the recession (from
1.5% of the GDP in Q1 2011 to 2.3% in Q1 2012) as imports increased faster than exports
(respectively 21.6% and 9.1%). The overall deficit of the balance of payments was lower than in
Q1 2011 due to an increase in financial accounts (mainly via foreign direct investments and public
indebtedness). As a consequence of account deficits, the Central Bank reserves depleted from
113 days of imports at the end of 2011 to 101 days in Q1 2012", which might be seen as an
alarming sign of vulnerability regarding the Tunisian currency (the relatively long term nature of
foreign capital mainly composed of foreign direct investments and long-term debt is reassuring
tough).
As displayed in Figure 1.21, the government budget deficit had been historically low until the
revolution hit the country. The deficit went from -1.3% in 2010 to -4.3% in 2011. In the 2012
budget, the government expects it to reach -6.2% in 2012 (above the threshold of -5 % usually
seen by economists as the "psychological" threshold). This element might appear even more
alarming when one notes that government projections of GDP growth (3 .5 % in 2012) and tax
collections are optimistic.
1 Tunisian Central Bank, "Conjoncture 6conomique et financiere nationale: principales 6volutions jusqu'au 16
avril 2012" (National economic and financial situtation: main evolutions until April 16,2012), 2012
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Figure 1.21:
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The Tunisian public debt to GDP ratio decreased from 60% in 2003 to 41% in 2010 (Figure
1.22). The trend inverted in 2010 (ratio of 43%) and is expected to follow the same direction in
2012 (the ratio is expected to rise to 46%). Based on the criteria of economic orthodoxy (the
European Maastricht Treaty sets the level of acceptable indebtedness to 60% of GDP) and the
current world's ratio (estimated at around 70% by the IMF), such levels of indebtedness seems to
be sustainable. The low leverage of the country should give the government some room for
manoeuvre to finance the nation's deficits and the investments needed to help the economy
recover.
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Figure 1.22:
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B) Investment Env ronment
Revolulionl anid limes/or Coifidenice
An increase in the CDS spread of government bonds (cost of insurance) and a credit
downgrade are often seen by foreign investors as appealing signs of increased investment
riskiness. In this regards, S&P and Moody's cut the credit rating of Tunisia by one notch while
CDS spreads increased from 120 bps (13"' January 2011) to 275.5 bps (9t' December 2011)'8.
However, indicators on the activity of foreign investors reflect even better the perception of the
country by the investment community. While portfolio investments (in stocks, bonds or other
liquid securities) are not "reliable" inflows of capital, foreign direct investments ("FDIs") not
only are a stable source of foreign capital for the Central Bank but also contribute to productive
investments in the economy. Foreign direct investments represent a substantial source of capital
inflows for the Tunisian Central Bank; according to the World Bank's dataset, FDIs represented
on average 5.2% of the Tunisian GDP between 2006 and 2010. Moreover, FDIs have by far the
largest share in foreign investments (on average 95% versus 5% for portfolio investments between
2006 and 2011).
The economic and social instability following the revolution in January 2011 seems to have
spread fear among the foreign investor community. As displayed in Figure 1.232, FDIs dropped
by 25.7% in 2011 '. Some key sectors were more particularly hit by the decline in FDISs: -83%
drop in tourism, -42% in manufacturing and -19% for energy.
18 Gulf Research Center
19 The Foreign Investment Promotion Agency (FIPA), "FDI Performance during 2011", 2012
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There is a good case to make that the decrease in foreign investments and the increase in
trade deficits are partly attributable to the Eurozone crisis (Europe represents nearly 80% of
Tunisian exports), but there is no doubt that the uncertainty subsequent to the Tunisian
revolution has severely challenged investor confidence and has put Tunisia in the spotlight.
The interviews conducted among the business community lead to the same conclusion: most
investors are currently in a wait-and-see position. Several factors explain skepticism among
investors:
- The current social environment is still very unstable (illegal and violent strikes, strong
decrease in productivity).
- The Islamic party in power raises suspicion among the investment community.
- The government's ability to solve the economic and social issues is nothing but granted.
- There is a significant uncertainty about future developments in Libya.
- Sales in 2011 were below companies' previsions (as stated by 62% of the companies
interviewed in a research conduct by Ernst & Young20 between April and May 2011). The
underperformance is mainly due to the decrease in internal demand and exports, the
disruptions in supply chain and distribution channels, production issues (staff strikes) and
delivery problems.
Uncertainty also creates hopes about future developments as a new democratic environment
is potentially a positive progress towards more transparency, less corruption, and infine a more
business-friendly environment. The new government has shown some signs that it is willing to
20 Ernst & Young, "Revolution Opportunities", 2011
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Figure 1.23:
restore investor confidence; when he was appointed as the new Minister of Industry and Trade in
December 2011, Mr. Mohamed Lamine Chakhari, officially declared that one of the current
government's priorities will be to restore confidence amongst Tunisian and foreign investors as
well as stimulate investments in inland areas. Even though there is no clear communication
strategy yet, the positive energies created around the Tunisian revolution have resulted in a
willingness to restore investor confidence. As a matter of fact, Christine Lagarde, the Managing
Director of the International Monetary Fund ("IMF"), visited Tunisia in February 2012 and made
it clear that the IMF was ready to help the country restore confidence among the investment
community and evoked the possibility of a loan. The Tunisian Investment Forum organized on
the 17"' of June 2011 under the leadership Beji Caid Essebsi (the Prime Minister in charge before
the election of the Constituent Assembly) is an example of communication initiatives the current
government can pursue in order to revitalize investment in Tunisia. The year 2012 started in a
more positive note as FDIs increased by 30% versus Q1 2011 (Figure 1.23).
1Ivestmenlt . lltractivnes., o/ Tunisia
Despite the current instability and the relatively small size of the Tunisian economy, there are
several arguments to make in favor of investing in Tunisia.
The country has a strategic position in the Mediterranean area and is at the crossroads of
Europe, the Middle-East and Sub-Saharan Africa. Some tools for economic cooperation are
already in place (free trade agreement with the European Union, Arab Mediterranean agreement,
free trade agreement) but more integration is needed with North African, Middle-Eastern and
Sub-Saharan countries in order to leverage such position.
Based on the Global Competitiveness Report published by the World Economic Forum2 1
(Figure 1.24), Tunisia compares extremely well with its neighbors as it is ranked 1S" among South
Mediterranean countries and 40t" worldwide (in front of Italy).
In terms of basic requirements, its high score of 5.05 out of 7.0 reflects particularly the
solidity and quality of its infrastructure (9 airports and 7 commercial seaports to connect the
country to the rest of the world, fairly efficient internal communication and transport
infrastructure even though inland areas are not very well connected yet, service infrastructure at
competitive rental costs), the strong macroeconomic fundamentals (at least prior to the
revolution), the high quality of its health infrastructure as well as the high level of primary
education, the relatively good quality of its institutions, the relatively solid legal and regulatory
framework (freedom of investment in most of the sectors; free transfer of profits, capital and
capital gains, simplified procedures for business creation, fiscal incentives for companies which
export and/or invest in underdeveloped regions).
Tunisia is also relatively well-positioned regarding "efficiency enhancers". More specifically,
skilled labor is available (65,000 new graduates of higher education per year', diverse programs to
improve employability and reduce unemployment); the goods market is fairly efficient (business
productivity, attractiveness for FDIs, healthy market competition, demanding consumers); the
expansion of financial markets is on the right path; the labor market is more efficient and flexible
than it is in other countries despite the high level of unemployment rate; there is a good
understanding and use of technology (especially information and communication technology, or
"ICT").
21 World Economic Forum, "The Global Competitiveness Report 2011-2012"
2 The Foreign Investment Promotion Agency (FIPA), "New Tunisia, New Opportunities", 2012
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In terms of innovation and business sophistication, Tunisia is also in a better position than its
South Mediterranean neighbors (notably Algeria, Morocco, Egypt and Turkey). Even though its
business sophistication does not meet the standards of developed markets yet, the overall quality
of business networks as well as firms' operations and strategies is good. Its innovation potential is
also promising (availability of recent technologies; availability of engineers and scientists; 30 R&D
centers and 28,000 researchers; 10 existing poles of competitiveness and 14 planned2 ; strong
potential in computer science, pharmaceuticals and ICT).
Figure 1.24:
Benchmarking the Competitiveness of Tunisia
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2. Specific Features of Private Equity in Tunisia
1) Why is Private Equity Important for Tunisia?
While banks' financing are "passive" investments, private equity funds typically invest in
equity or equity-like securities and aim to be active investors. As a consequence, they contribute
in many ways to improving the management of portfolio companies.
- They typically enhance good practices and procedures. Proper corporate governance is
put in place and more transparency is internally promoted. Accounting standards and
internal control are improved.
- They help improve the capital structure of companies. Most of Tunisian companies are
indeed abnormally overleveraged as relatively well-performing companies have easy
access to debt financing and shareholders often dry up their company's treasury. Growth
capital private equity capital would help de-lever portfolio companies.
- Banks are much more risk averse than private equity investors. The latter are willing to
put capital more at risk and support development objectives.
- Private equity investors bring their expertise, experience and contacts in order to help
companies scale up, grow rapidly and become more efficient.
- Most importantly, contribution to companies' growth also improves social development
(and creates particularly more jobs) and can increase government tax revenues even when
fiscal incentives for PE investments are in place.
The analysis of Tuninvest-Africinvest's pan-African portfolio (of which Tunisian companies)
provides a good illustration of private equity investors' contribution to economic growth, tax
revenues and social development".
Figure 2.1 shows the improvement of several economic indicators for Tuninvest-Africinvest's
portfolio companies. Sales, exports, EBITDA and equity value more or less doubled. When the
analysis is limited to companies held for at least two years, the contribution is even higher:
- Sales were multiplied by 2.4x (CAGR of 16/6)
- Exports were multiplied by 3.2x (CAGR of 21%) despite the recent decrease in exports to
OECD countries
- EBITDA increased at a CAGR of 21% (higher than sales' growth, which indicates an
improvement in margins and productivity)
23 Tuninvest-Africinvest's presentation available on the website of African Development Bank, June 2011
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Figure 2.1:
The Case of Tuninvest-Africinvest: Contribution to Economic Growth
In Mi//ion Euos
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Soune: Tuninvest-Africinvest's presentation available on the website of the African Development Bank, June 2011
At the level of portfolio companies, Tuninvest-Africinvest's private equity investments
contributed to tax revenues of national governments through higher growth of employment and
taxable income (Figure 2.2). When the analysis is limited to companies held for at least 2 years,
total tax contributions grew on average 2.2 times (CAGR of 15%) despite the tax rebates meant
to promote exports in many countries.
Figure 2.2:
The Case of Tuninvest-Africinvest: Contribution to Tax Revenues
In Milion Eums
371 424
27
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I 1.4x
VAT Corporate Tax Taxes on Salares Total Tax
M At Entry E At Exit/Current
Soum: Tuninvest-Aficinvest's presentation available on the website of the African Development Bank, June 2011
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Tuninvest-Africinvest's private equity investments have strongly contributed to social
development as data on number of employees, salaries and training budget shows (Figure 2.3).
The impact is even greater when the analysis is conducted for portfolio companies held for at
least two years:
- Staff size grew by 86% on average during the holding period
- Total salaries were multiplied on average by 2.2x (CAGR of 14%)
- Training budget was multiplied on average by 3.3x for companies reporting training
budget data
Figure 2.3:
The Case of Tuninvest-Africinvest: Contribution to Social Development
In Mi//ion Euos'
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*Except for "Number of Employees"
" Only 50% of the portfolio companies reported traming budget data
Soun: Tuninvest-Africinvest's presentation available on the website ofthe African Development Bank, June 2011
2) Overview of Private Equity in Tunisia
A) Domestic Prixate lquiry FL1d
In Tunisia, the private equity sector started developing in 1995 through domestic investment
vehicles called "SICARs" ("Soci&t6 d'investissement i Capital Risque" in French, or "Investment
Company in Risk Capital" in English). In 2005, a new type of funds, "FCPRs" ("Fonds Commun
de Placements i Risques" in French, or "Private Equity Mutual Funds" in English), was
launched. These two forms of investment vehicles currently constitute the landscape of domestic
private equity players in Tunisia. The "ATIC" (Association Tunisienne des Investisseurs en
Capital" in French, "Tunisian Private Equity Association" in English) currently counts 42 active
members (SICARs and companies managing FCPRs). While FCPRs are still relatively
underrepresented, SICARs can be broken down into four main groups: SICARs launched by
financial institutions, SICARs created by non-financial groups, regional SICARs, and independent
SICARs.
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The creation of SICAR firms is mainly regulated by a law established in 1995 (Law Nr. 95-
87). The main characteristics of SICARs are as follows (the modifications recently introduced via
the two statutory laws, Nr. 99 and 100, published in October 2011, are not taken into account at
this stage):
- SICAR companies aim to consolidate Tunisian companies' equity by investing their own
funds or funds provided by third parties.
- Their resources are constituted by their own equity as well as funds deposited by public
or private third parties. The total funds should be at least equal to TND 500,000.
- They intervene by way of subscription or through the acquisition of a range of securities
as determined by the legislation in force. This group of securities encompasses common
shares, preferred shares without voting rights, investment certificates, and convertible
bonds.
- Investments must be subject to an agreement with target companies; such agreement shall
define the terms of entry, monitoring and exit.
- They are not allowed to have a majority stake in portfolio companies.
- They have a legal requirement on the use of their capital; at least 65% of the contributed
capital needs to be invested by the end of the fiscal year following the year of the capital
contribution (by investors) within the scope of the following list:
o Companies having activities in underdeveloped regions as defined by the
Investment Code
o New projects in small and medium-sized companies (companies are considered as
"SMEs" if they have less than TND 4 million in net fixed assets and less than 300
employees)
o Start-up companies managed by "new" entrepreneurs (one of the criteria is that
the project must be the first entrepreneurial experience for the entrepreneur)
o Companies investing in the promotion or the development of new technologies in
the economic sectors defined by the Investment Code, or in the "ICT" sector
(Information and Communications Technology)
o Investment in the upgrade of companies within a program authorized by a public
comity ("Comit6 de Pilotage")
o Turnaround investments targeting companies facing a difficult situation
The creation of FCPR funds is mainly regulated by a law established in 2005 (Law Nr. 2005-
105). The main characteristics of FCPRs are as follows:
- FCPRs are security investment mutual funds managed by a separated company.
- They have the same activity scope and legal requirements as SICARs.
- They aim to manage funds provided by third party investors for a pre-determined period
(funds shall be liquidated). The minimum amount required for initial contributed funds is
TND 100,000.
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- Upon liquidation, initial funds and potential capital gains shall be distributed to investors
as determined by an initial agreement. A lock-up period during which investors are not
entitled to redeem their funds shall be pre-agreed.
FI sad Inlcentives
The development of domestic private equity funds in Tunisia has been mainly triggered by
fiscal incentives put in place. Such fiscal incentives are two-fold for investors in SICARs or
FCPRs (prior the promulgation of the two statutory laws in October 2011):
- Incentives at entry:
o Tax relief with a minimum tax payment (20% tax rate for corporations) and a limit
of 35% of the taxable income eligible to such treatment
o There is neither a minimum tax payment nor a limit for income to be reinvested
for investors if the SICAR (or FCPR) invests more than 75% of the contributed
capital in underdeveloped regions as defined by the Investment Code
o Conditions to take advantage of the tax relief:
" Providing the tax administration with a written proof from the managing
company showing either that the capital provided has indeed been
invested according to the conditions underlying the fiscal advantages, or
that the managing company intends to do so within one year from the
date of the capital contribution or placement
* No capital redemption or reduction for at least 5 years
* No tangible guarantees provided by the portfolio company or its
shareholders in order to secure the investment
* The investment shall not be subject to payments uncorrelated to the
results of the company
- Incentives at exit:
o Full tax exemption of capital gains
" Otherwise, for physical persons domiciled in Tunisia, capital gains are
taxed at a rate of 10% (after deduction of capital losses); they are taxed at
the marginal corporate tax rate (30%) for moral persons (after deduction
of capital losses)
Domlesic PE j11u'nds'aaivity
As displayed in Figure 2.4, the investment activity of (domestic) Tunisian PE funds started
taking off in 2008. Not only investments increased from TND 47 million to TND 171 million
(CAGR of 54% p.a. with a peak of TND 209 million in 2009) but (domestic) PE penetration
(which is a common indicator of PE weight in the economy) soared as well (from 0.09% in 2007
to 0.27% in 2010 with a peak of 0.35% in 2009). While an increased awareness of fiscal incentives
and a progressively less constraining legal framework might explain such take-off, the figures are
biased to some extent: a significant portion of those investments considered as "PE" investments
are debt-like investments (cf. carrying agreements below) and diverge from the industry
standards. Besides, the number of investments increased at a slower pace, which resulted in an
increase in the average target size, from an average of c. TND 420k over 2002-2007 to an average
of c. TND 720k over 2008-2010. This shift translates the expansion of growth capital
investments versus VC investments.
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Figure 2.5 shows that the accumulated dry powder of domestic PE funds between 2007 and
2010 grew at a fast pace (17% CAGR), which mirrors investors' increased willingness to commit
capital in domestic PE funds.
Figure 2.5:
Local PE Funds' Dry Powder
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Soune: ATIC
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Figure 2.6 shows that the sector is overwhelmingly dominated by SICARs owned by banks.
In 2010, they accounted for 2/3 of the total activity both in terms of dry powder and realized
investments. However, FCPRs are expected to have more importance over the next few years as
they offer more advantages. More specifically, their share in realized investments is expected to
grow significantly. They represented 1/5 of the total cumulative capital raised versus only 5% of
the total investments made in 2010.
Figure 2.6:
Breakdown of Cumulative Capital Raised by Type of Breakdown of Realized Investments by Type of Local PE
Local PE Fund (2010) Fund (2010)
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Experts in Tunisia agree that the vast majority of domestic private equity funds are not "real"
private equity players and that the expected results in terms of economic impact have not been
reached. The shortfalls of the current system in place are developed below.
a) The typical GP-LP relationship is not in place
First, the dynamics under which a team of private equity professionals forms and aims to
raise funds among the LP community is inexistent. Independent managing companies are scarce
and most of SICARs are launched at the initiative of a unique institution or a limited pool of
institutions (financial institutions or "big" non-financial groups). The recruited managing team
usually has no experience in private equity, or more generally asset management (typical managers
have a career in retail banking or an industrial expertise). Traditionally, the fundraising period
(fund structuring, marketing, negotiation with investors, fund setup) is fundamental in the sense
that it structures the team and sets clear objectives. The inverted relationship in SICARs and
FCPRs (with investors setting up the fund from the outset) kills such dynamics.
Second, the way funds and compensation are structured does not incentivize funds'
managers. In the case of SICARs, two compelling examples can be evoked: the absence of carried
interests as a way of compensating fund managers and the inconsistency of funds' lifecycle.
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In a typical GP-LP relationship, LPs make sure that the fund managers are incentivized
enough to provide the best return possible. In order to do so, they give up a share of the profits
as a way to compensate managers (usually 20% of the capital gain in the simplest cases). On the
contrary, SICAR managers are generally paid a fixed compensation regardless the returns they
generate, which obviously provides less incentives to generate good returns.
The inconsistency of funds' lifecycle worsens the lack of incentives for managers to generate
good returns. On the one hand, there is no pre-agreed liquidation date; shares are redeemed and
dividends are paid over time; the fund can also be replenished by fresh equity. Therefore,
managers do not have any pressure to stand out with a good track record in order to raise next
funds as it is the case in typical PE funds. Besides, the theoretically indefinite life of the fund
exacerbates the lack of incentives for managers to actively seek attractive exits while the higher
duration of held investments might affect negatively IRRs. On the other hand, it is very common
that 100% of the funds subscribed by investors are delivered upfront. Usually, investors should
commit their capital at the initiation of the fund; fund managers would call part of those funds as
deals are progressively generated. Consequently, domestic PE fund managers become asset
managers and it is very frequent to see on the balance sheet significant investments in stocks,
other mutual funds, etc.
Third, SICARs are at the same time funds and managing companies. Indeed, they are
typically set up as "SA" ("Societe Anonyme" in French), which is the equivalent for the US
Corporation. Such setups often create conflict interests as investors typically have a seat on the
board of the SICAR and would influence managers' investment decisions.
As a consequence, a law promulgated in 2005 established the legal framework for FCPRs in
order to overcome part of such shortfalls. FCPRs have the same fiscal advantages and scope of
activity as SICARs but they have a different legal status: they are not considered as "moral
persons" in the sense that they need to be managed by an independent managing company and
they also have a finite life. They need to be authorized by the "CMF" ("Conseil du Marche
Financier", the equivalent for the SEC in the US). Such structures encourage a more incentivizing
compensation for managers.
The comparison of different funds in Table 2.1 shows that the practice has improved since
FCPRs have been introduced.
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- Most of funds are set-up for a 10-year period with 2 years of potential life extension.
- Contributed capital is locked-up for at least 5 years (in order to take advantage of the tax
relief up-front).
- A team dynamics among fund managers seems to have developed. Some of them are
acting more like fundraiser as they pitch several investors in order to make them commit
PE capital. For example, the fund managers of Alternative Capital Partners ("ACP")
managed to have a number of European institutional investors (such as the European
Investment Bank and CDC Entreprises) and Tunisian institutional investors (of which
large banks such as the Arab Tunisian Bank, the Amen Bank, the Bank de l'Habitat, and
Insurance or Leasing companies such as the Arab Tunisian Lease, the Groupe des
Assurances de Tunisie) to commit TND 10 million in the seed/early VC fund raised in
2007 ("Phenicia Seed Fund"). The capital was planned to be called and contributed over
time (4 contributions of TND 2.5 million). The team also co-manages the EUR 75
million small-cap fund raised by the French Viveris Management; ACP team takes care of
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Table 2.1:
Name of d Fund
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investments in Tunisia (and potentially Algeria and Egypt) while two other teams manage
investments in Turkey and Morocco.
Overall, compensation structures provide better incentives to managers. Phenicia Seed
Fund managed by ACP probably provides the best illustration. Net profits are distributed
to investors first until they reach a 6% hurdle rate (in other words, investors are first paid
back their contributed capital, then the share of the remaining profits allowing them to
reach a 6% IRR). Then, fund managers are paid 25% of the amount allowing investors to
get a 6% IRR. Finally, the reminder is split up between the investors and ACP managers,
with 80% going to the former and 20% to the latter. Such structure is said to have
disappearing preferential returns. As displayed in the scenario analysis below (Table 2.2),
the fund managers need to deliver more than 6% IRR in order to get performance fees
and more than c.8% IRR in order to have a share of 20% of the total capital gain after
catching-up. Table 2.2 shows 3 scenarios (IRR of 3%, 6.5% and 15%) and their impact
on the performance fees. For simplicity sake, all cash flows are supposed to flow out
upon the liquidation of the fund and that the TND 10 million of investors' capital is fully
paid-in up-front. The payoffs to investors and fund managers entailed by such structure
are summarized in the payoff diagrams (Figure 2.7).
Table 2.2:
Scenario 1 Scenario 1: IRR = 3%
Scenario 2: IRR = 6.5%
Scenario 3: RR = 15%
Capital Contribution TND 10,000
Investment Period 10 Years
Hurdle Rate 6%
% of Hurdle Performance to Managers 25%
Managers' share in Reminder 20%
Fund's IRR 3.0%
Years 0 10
Capital Contdbution TND 10,000
Fund's Final Cash Flow Assuming 3.0% IRR TND 13,439
Fund's Final Cash Flow Needed for a 6.0% Hurdle Rate TND 17,908
Capital Gain Corresponding to a 6.0% IRR TND 7,908
1) Share Redemption + Preferred Payment to Investors TND 13,439
2) Compensation to Managers for Readiing Hurdle Rate
Reminder to be Split
3.1) Investors' Share in Reminder
3.2) Investors' Share in Reminder -
Total Capital Gain TND 3,439
Total Investors' Compensation TND 3,439
Investors' Compensation as % of Capital Gain 100.0/0
Total Managers' Compensation -
Innestors' Compensation as % of Capital Gain 0.0/
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Scenario 2 jScenario 1: IRR = 3%
Scenario 2: IRR = 6.5%
Scenario 3: IRR = 15%
Years 0 10
Capital Contribution TND 10,000
Fund's Final Cash Flow Assuming 6.5% IRR TND 18,771
Fund's Final Cash Flow Needed for a 6.0% Hurdle Rate TND 17,908
Capital Gain Corresponding to a 6.0% IRR TND 7,908
1) Share Redemption + Preferred Payment to Investors TND 17,908
2) Compensation to Managers for Reading Hurdle Rate TND 863
Reminder to be Split
3.1) Investors' Share in Reminder
3.2) Investors' Share in Reminder
Total Capital Gain TND 8,771
Total Investors' Compensation TND 7,908
Invstors' Compensation as % of Capital Gain 90.2%
Total Managers' Compensation TND 863
Invstors' Compensation as % of Capital Gain 9.8%
Scenario r n 3 Scenario 1: IRR = 3%
Scenario 2: IRR = 6.5%
Scenario 3: IRR = 15%
3
3
Years
Capital Contribution
Fund's Final Cash Flow Assuming 15.0% IRR
Fund's Final Cash Flow Needed for a 6.0% Hurdle Rate
Capital Gain Corresponding to a 6.0% IRR
1) Share Redemption + Preferred Payment to Investors
2) Compensation to Managers for Readiing Hurdle Rate
Reminder to be Split
.1) Investors' Share in Reminder
.2) Investors' Share in Reminder
0
TND 10,000
TND 40,456
TND 17,908
TND 7,908
TND 17,908
TND 1,977
TND 20,570
TND 16,456
TND 4,114
Total Capital Gain
Total Investors' Compensation
Inivstors' Compensation as % of Capital Gain
Total Managers' Compensation
Innstors' Compensation as % of Capital Gain
10
TND 30,456
TND 24,364
80.0%
TND 6,091
20.0%
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Figure 2.7:
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However, the analysis
several flaws in the system
of the different
and that industry
funds in Table 2.1 also suggests that there are still
standards are not respected to some extent:
Some funds are still launched at the initiative of a unique investor. For example, "ATID
I" is an FCPR managed by ATID Co., a subsidiary of Al Baraka Bank (which promoted
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the fund while being at the same time the deposit bank). Even though it is not clear
whether other investors committed to the fund, the fact that the managing company is
not independent hurts somehow the dynamics proper to a PE team.
- Except for Phenicia Seed Fund which clearly states that the funds committed will be
called over time in 4 settlements of TND 2.5 million, other fund managers seem to have
called the capital committed by investors upon the fund's formation. Therefore, during
the first years of the fund's life, there is a mismatch between the cash available and the
deal flow: managers have significant excess cash to handle while according to the industry
standards, committed capital should be called as deal opportunities come up.
- A direct consequence of the precedent statement is that fund managers often become
asset managers: as previously developed, it is not rare to see on the balance sheet
investments in stock, bonds and mutual funds. The most extreme case is Fidelium Essor
FCPR: as of 31-December-2010, about 70% of total assets were investments in the stock
market.
- Performance fees are rarely as well structured as in the example of Phenicia Seed Fund.
Most of them are structured around a hurdle rate, which is common in the industry.
However, they often work against fund managers' interests for two main reasons. First,
they do not include a catch-up provision (which makes managers able to "catch-up" their
"lost" share of profits because of the preference provision put in place by investors, by
capturing 100% of the cash flows until they reach the final target rate of net profits they
contractually agreed upon). Second, some of them use hurdle rates which are far from the
industry standard and do little to incentivize managers. For example, the managing
company of FCPR Valeurs Developpement, Tunisie Valeurs, would get performance fees
only if it reaches an IRR above 55% whereas the industry standard stands at 8%21. Finally,
in some cases, the share of profits above the hurdle rate allocated to fund managers are
well above the industry standard (20%), which plays against the investors' interests. This
is the case for the Tunisian Development Fund managed by UGFS-NA where the
managers would get 50% of the profits above a hurdle rate of 8%.
- Ultimately, most funds have no particular focus within the private equity spectrum. While
ticket sizes are small across the entire spectrum (from USD 100k to USD 5.0m)
compared to standards in developed markets, most of companies at least invest in VC
and PE growth capital at the same time.
b) Deal structures are flawed as most investments embed a carrying agreement
Most investments made by SICARs and fund managers of FCPRs embed a "carrying
agreement" feature. Such agreements are much more similar to debt than equity. More
specifically, domestic PE funds contractually secure their investment by pre-agreeing with
entrepreneurs upon fixed interest payments (the standard is 8-9%2) along with a pre-arranged
retrocession schedule (fixing the timing and modalities under which the investment firm would
retrocede shares to the entrepreneur(s)). Moreover, the fixed interest payments of 8-9% are not
as riskless as fund managers would have expected since the share of lost investments and "stuck"
investments (no exit possible due to the inability of the entrepreneur to redeem SICAR or
FCPR's shares) is significant. There seems to be a mispricing of the risk embedded in such
structures by the fund managers: while the upside is capped by the fixed interest payments and
24 Andrew Metrick & Ayako Yasuda, "The Economics of Private Equity Funds"
2s Research Report Nr. 35, Tunisie Valeurs, November 2006
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the redemption of principal at its face value, the risk of getting stuck and not being able to exit is
relatively high (cf. breakdown of SICARs' returns in Figure 2.8).
Figure 2.8:
Breakdown of Returns Performed by SICARs
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The development of such a practice is mainly driven by the fact that SICARs are often an
extension of the retail banking activity. According to a report published in the context of a
seminar around private equity (organized in 2005)2", at least 80% of the investments made by
SICARs owned by financial and non-financial institutions in 2005 embedded a carrying
agreement. Moreover, a significant share of investments made by SICARs owned by banks
targets companies which are already customers of the retail banking segment: SICARs typically
"lend" money to clients who cannot borrow enough from the typical retail banking channel due
to a lack of tangible guarantees (even though they sometimes go to the point of pledging the
investments made by SICARs with the entrepreneur's shares or intangible assets). Instead of
helping portfolio companies grow through monitoring and advisory, fund managers often spend
their time negotiating and enforcing the carrying agreements.
The recourse to carrying agreement also creates a negative dynamics in the industry: as long
as such structures remain possible, fund managers who wish to invest in riskier securities
(typically common equity) have a competitive disadvantage. Entrepreneurs are indeed often
reluctant to open their capital and prefer fixed arrangements under which they are able to capture
all the upside.
Another deleterious effect of carrying agreements is that they encourage entrepreneurs to be
less transparence and misconduct in terms of corporate governance. As a matter of fact, since
entrepreneurs need to pay interests and buy back the shares of PE funds according to a pre-
arranged schedule, they become more likely to take the money from the company's treasury in
order to do so.
2 Pierre Hoessler, "Rapport Final de Mission", February-March 2005
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This practice was not forbidden until recently (on the contrary, the law used to make pre-
arrangements in view of retrocession mandatory). Yet, a law promulgated in January 2009 clearly
stipulates that SICARs and FCPR fund managers can no longer pre-arrange with the initial
shareholders of their portfolio companies any kind of payment uncorrelated to the company's
results and performance. Even though the legislation regarding carrying agreements has recently
evolved in the right direction, such contracts are allegedly still a common practice among
domestic PE funds.
c) Funds' investors are mainly driven by fiscal incentives instead of deal returns
The way fiscal incentives are structured does little to "professionalize" the industry. It
provides an additional incentive for investors to take less risk and hold on to the practice of
carrying agreements: fiscal incentives tremendously boost the value of their investments.
Consequently, a typical 9 % IRR delivered by (allegedly) low-risk carrying agreements turns out to
be enough. The Excel model displayed in Table 2.3 shows how fiscal incentives impact the IRR
and the net present value of PE investments.
Table 2.3:
Fiscal Incentives for SICARs & FCPRs - Impact on IRR
Seario I Scenario 1: min. 65% intsted in the list, 35% of taxable income reineasted
Scenario 2: min. 65% inseted in the list, 100% of taxable income nnteated
Scenario 3: win. 65% invested in the list, 20% of taxable income reinirsted
Scenario 4: min. 65% inesated in the list. 33.3% of taxable income trinvested
Scenario 5: min. 75% inestedin anderevloped regions. 100% of taxable income ninerted
Taxable Income 10,000
Investment Peuod 10Years
Corporate Tax Rate 30%
Share of Taxable Income Invested in Year 0 35%
Minimum Tax Rate 20%
Pre-Arranged Fixed Interest Rates in SICAR Investments 9%
Cost of Capital 9/0
Years 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
TaxableIncome 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000
Investment in SICARs (3,500) - - - - - - -
Tax Expense if no Investment in SICARs (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000)
New Tax Expense (2,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3.000)
Fiscal Gain 1,000 - - -
Pre-Arranged Fixed Interest Payment 315 315 315 315 315 315 315 315 315 315
Prncipal Redemption -- - - - 3,500
Cash Flows Available to Distribution (2,500) 315 315 315 315 315 315 315 315 315 3,815
Discount Factor @ 9% 1.04 0.92 0.84 0. 77 0.71 0.65 0.60 0.55 0.50 0.46 0.42
Discounted Cash Flows (2,500) 289 265 243 223 205 188 172 158 145 1,611
IRR at the Investor Level 14.6%
Investment NPV 10I
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% of Taxable Income Reinvested 33.3%
Investment in SICAR 3,333
Tax Expense without Minimum Consttaint (2,000)
Minimum Tax Expense (2,000)
Scenario 1: win. 65% inesedin the list. 35% of taxable income reinaested
Scenari 2: rin. 65% intested in the list, 100% /tofaxabk income reinested
Scenario3: win. 65% inisfed in the/lit. 260% of taxable income reiniested
Scenaio 4: xin. 65% inested in the list. 33.3% of taxale income reinasted
Scenario 5: win. 75% injested in nekrdenlaped regionr, 100% of taxable income reinserted
Yeas
TaxableInome
Investment in SICARs
Tax Expense if no Investment in SICARs
New Tax Expense
Fismal Gain
Pre-Ananged Fixed Interest Payment
Prncipal Redemption
Cash Flows Available to Distribution
Disoiunt Factor @ 9 %
Discounted Cash Flows
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000
(10,000)
(3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000)
(2,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000)
1,000
- 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900
- -- 10,000
(9,000) 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 10,900
1.00 0.92 0.84 0.77 0.71 0.65 0.60 0.55 0.50 0.46 0.42
(9,000) 826 758 695 638 585 537 492 452 414 4,604
IIRR at the Investor Level 10.7%Investment NPV I0
3n Scenario 1: win. 65% inistedin the list, 35% of taxable income rinmstid
Scenario 2: min. 65% inwisted in the list 100% of taxable income reiniested
Scenario 3: min. 65% ine sted in the list. 
2 0
%o of taxable income reinasted
Scenario 4: min. 65% ineasted in the list, 33.3% of taxable income reiniested
Scenario 5: min. 75% inestedin nntderdteloped regions. 100% of taxable income Mrinested
Years
Taxable Inome
Investment in SICARs
Tax Expense if no Investment in SICARs
New Tax Expense
Fisal Gain
Pre-Artanged Fixed Interest Payment
Prinopal Redemption
Cash Flows Available to Distribution
Distount Factor @ 9%
Discounted Cash Flows
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000
(2,000) - -
(3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000)
(2,400) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000)
600 
-
- 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180
- - - - - - ,000
(1,400) 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 2,180
100 0.92 0.84 0.77 0.71 0.65 0.60 0.55 0.50 0.46 0.42
(1,400) 165 152 139 128 117 107 98 90 83 921
IRR at the Investor Level 15.0/
Investment NPV 600
Scenario Scenario 1: min. 65% inwstedin the list, 35% of taxable income reinwsted
Scenario 2: min. 65% inteated in the list, 10 0 % of taxable income reinnsted
Scenario 3: min. 65% inested in the list. 20% of taxable income reinmsted
Scenario 4: min. 65% intested in the list, 33.3% of taxable income reinsested
Scenario 5: rin. 75% iniestedin unerdevlopfdregions, 100% f taxabl income eitnsited
4
Years
Taxable Inome
Investment in SICARs
Tax Expenseifno Investment in SICARs
New Tax Expense
Fisal Gain
Pre-Arranged Fixed Interest Payment
Pontipal Redemption
Cash Flows Available to Distribution
Disount Factor @ 9 "
Discounted Cash Flows
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10'100
(3,333) - - - -
(3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000)
(2,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000)
1,000 - -
- 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300
- - - - - - - 3,333
(2,333) 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 3,633
1.00 0.92 0.84 0.77 071 0.65 0.60 0.55 0.50 0.46 0.42
(2,333) 275 253 232 213 195 179 164 151 138 1,535
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2n
IRR at the Investor Level 15.0%
Investment NPV 1,000
Scenario 5 Scenario 1: min. 65% unsted in the jist, 35% of taxable income reiniested
Scenario 2: min. 65% inaeted in the Art, 100% of taxable income einisted
Scenario 3: mim. 65% iinested in the li1. 20% of taxable income reinozsted
Senafao 4: mi. 65% inmted in the lit, 33.30% of taxabe income eintsted
Scenario : min. 75% inmstedin underlwopedregins. 100% of taxable income reinested
Years 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Taxable Income 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000
Investment in SICARs (10,000) -
Tax Expense ifno Investment in SICARs (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3.000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000)
New Tax Expense - (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000) (3,000)
Fisnl Gain 3,000 - -
Pte-Ataanged Fixed Interest Payment - 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900
Puncipal Redemption - - - - - 10,000
Cash Flows Available to Distribution (7,000) 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 10,900
Discrunt Factot @ 9% 1.00 0.92 0.84 0.77 0.71 0.65 0.60 0.55 0.50 0.46 0.42
Discounted Cash Flows (7,000) 826 758 695 638 585 537 492 452 414 4,604
IRR at the Investor Level 15.0%
Investment NPV 3000
1 assume that Company "A" generates a taxable income of 10,000 in year 0 and is subject to
the corporate marginal tax rate of 3 0%. "A" invests x% of its taxable income in a PE investment
vehicle "B" (SICAR or FCPR). The capital is locked-up in the fund for 10 years and available
cash flows are streamed up to investors each year (assuming neither management nor
performance fees for simplicity sake). I assume that "B" manages to invest the 10,000
contributed capital (in year 0) in deals based on carrying agreements yielding a fixed 9% per year.
In order to estimate the present value of the different strategy, I assume a cost of capital of 9%
(the carrying agreements are similar to debt; I - simplistically - assume in this case that they are
valued at par).
The first four scenarios assume that "B" will invest at least 65 % of the capital within the
scope of the Investment Code. In this case, "A" can invest at utmost 35% of its taxable income
in "B" and is subject to the minimum tax rate of 20%: this is Scenario 1. Under Scenario 1, the
combined effect of the IRR generated by "B" and the fiscal gain provide a total IRR of 14.6% for
"A". The net present value of the investment is equal to the fiscal gain generated in year 0 (under
the "at par" assumption), i.e. 1,000.
In Scenario 2, I assume that "A" invests its total taxable income in "B". As the limit of the
tax relief is set to 35% of the taxable income, the invested capital above the limit (i.e. 10,000-
35%*10,000 = 6,500) does not capture the fiscal incentives. The total IRR is lower than in the
first case and "only" equal to 10.7 %. The net present value of the investment is again equal to the
fiscal gain, i.e. 1,000.
In Scenario 3, I assume that "A" invests only 20% of its taxable income in "B". The IRR is
equal to 15% (because the constraint of 2 0% minimum tax rate is not triggered) but the net
present value is only equal to 600 because the fiscal gain is lower in this case ("A" does not take
full advantage of the tax relief by investing a lower amount in "B").
In Scenario 4, I assume that "A" invests the optimal level of its taxable income in "B". The
corresponding optimal investment rate (33.3%) is determined such as the tax expense under this
rate equates the expense to be paid under the 2 0% minimum tax rate regime. Indeed, in the case
where "A" invests over 33.3% of its taxable income and less than 35%, the fiscal gain/invested
amount ratio becomes lower because of the 2 0% minimum tax rate constraint. The net present
value in Scenario 4 is 1,000.
In Scenario 5, I assume that "B" invests at least 75% of the contributed capital in
underdeveloped region. In this case, "A" is allowed to deduct the totality of its investment from
its taxable income without any minimum tax expense constraint. By investing 100% of its total
taxable income, "A" maximizes its NPV (equal to the fiscal gain, i.e. 30%*10,000 = 3,000) and
delivers a 15% IRR.
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In conclusion, even when assuming that fund managers do not provide an intrinsic IRR
higher than the cost of capital, investing in a SICAR or an FCPR still have a great value in NPV
terms due to the fiscal gain up-front. As one would have expected, contributing capital in a PE
fund whose strategy is to invest at least 75% in underdeveloped regions provides the greatest
value because investors are able to deduct the whole amount from their fiscal base. If the fund
managers only invest a minimum of 65% in the list provided by the Investment Code and do not
particularly target underdeveloped regions, investors are better off committing at least 33.3% of
their taxable income in the fund. Investing less would imply a lower NPV because the fiscal gain
is not maximal. Above the 33.3% threshold, the IRR would continuously decrease because
amounts invested increase while fiscal gain does not. Therefore, investors' willingness to invest
more capital based on NPV maximization will depend on how comfortable they are about the
fund managers' ability to deliver an IRR (excluding fiscal impact) higher than the cost of capital.
d) Fiscal incentives preclude overwhelming investment constraints
Tunisian authorities have historically seen domestic PE funds as tools to strengthen growth
in underdeveloped region and to target the development of certain sectors of the economy. In
exchange, fiscal advantages are provided to investors having recourse to such tools. However, as
authorities infringed on fund managers' freedom to invest wherever they see value, the expected
results have not been delivered neither in terms of amount invested (only an aggregate amount of
c. TND 1.0 billion has been invested since 1995) nor in terms of good practice.
(ha/es, Recent/y Introduced b/ 1h Two Statuoirj Law Promugaited in; October 20 I
The two statutory laws (Nr. 99 and 100) published in October 2011 should improve the
overall regulatory environment for domestic funds.
First, they provide a more flexible framework as the investment constraints previously
prevailing were significantly relaxed. The set of tolerated investments was extended (all sectors
except real estate development, the housing market and to some extent the Tunisian stock
market). Now domestic PE funds are allowed to invest in sectors which do not benefit from
fiscal advantages. By lifting the restraining conditions on investments, this reform should help the
deal flow increase.
Second, to those who are eligible, fiscal advantages are no longer provided up-front under the
fund managers' commitment to respect the conditions underlying the fiscal advantages;
henceforth, they will be provided once the investments are undertaken and proven. This change
should entail a decrease in tax litigations and make fund managers think about their fund's
strategy from the outset (whether it should be fiscal-driven or not).
Third, the investment period was increased (2-3 years from the date of capital contribution
instead of 1-2 years). However, it still diverges from the PE industry standards and worsened by
the fact that the practice of capital commitment/capital calls is not well developed. The
revocation of this requirement would help managers be more selective in their deals and let them
freely define the investment period with their investors (typically 4-6 years after the initial capital
commitment).
Finally, the authorities repealed to a great extent the fiscal incentives at exit: capital gains are
not tax-exempt anymore. If the holding period is less than 5 years the full amount of the tax on
capital gains shall be paid (30% for corporations, 10% for individuals); there is a 50% rebate
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otherwise. Such decision is controversial for two reasons. First, the fiscal incentive at exit creates
the right inventive to invest "efficiently" in order to take advantage of the tax-exemption on
capital gains (whereas fiscal incentives at entry stays attractive for projects with an NPV equal to
0). There is a good case to make that the decision to withdraw the tax-exemption on capital gains
can desensitize investors to pour money into PE funds. Second, the differential of tax rates
triggered by a threshold holding period of 5 years intends to encourage PE fund managers to
increase their investment period. Such decision could make sense when authorities wish to
decrease investments driven by short-term gains. However, PE investments are typically held for
several years and PE fund managers decide to exit once they have created "enough" value and
see an exit opportunity. A good exit window might appear before the 5-year holding period; in
this case, the tax differential can prevent the fund managers from exiting and make them
withhold the exit. Should an attractive exit opportunity do not come up again, the bias introduced
by the tax differential could destroy value for investors.
B) Offsiore Priv\ate Equity Funds
"Offshore funds" are the second type of PE funds in Tunisia. Their managers raise capital in
a foreign currency (generally Euro or US dollar) and have a regional investment approach. Some
of them invest in the whole African continent (Actis, Emerging Capital Partners or "ECP",
Tuninvest-Africinvest), while others target the MENA region (Swicorp, North Africa Holding,
Abraaj Capital) or more specifically North Africa (Abraaj Capital through Kantara Investments,
Emergence North Africa Partners - currently in phase of fundraising -). Although development
financial institutions ("DFIs") such as the IFC and the EIB play an important role as LPs, they
also make some direct PE investments.
Using publicly available information, I count 30 deals from non-domestic PE funds to date.
20 of them have been sourced by Tuninvest-Africinvest's team, of which 16 were generated via
its first offshore fund "Tuninvest International Ltd". I estimate that the total capital invested to
date is approximately TND 240 million. Due to a lack of available information regarding deal
values, I made some assumptions when necessary (for example, if the ticket size range of the
investments is publicly available, I used the median of the range as a proxy for the deal value).
Excluding Tuninvest-Africinvest's investments, the total capital invested to date goes down to
TND 150 million. The implied average ticket size is TND 9 million (c. $6.5 million). It goes up to
TND 16 million (c. $11.5 million) when Tuninvest-Africinvest's investments are excluded.
Tuninvest-Africinvest's average ticket invested is smaller than other funds', especially for its first
offshore fund "Tuninvest International Ltd" with an average ticket size of less than TND 1
million ($13.5 million, 15 investments).
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Target Company Fund Manager Fund Owner
Sodete dArtides
Agromed
Alte Pakaging
PooinaGgoup
Holding
SACEM
Unimed
Opalia Phanno
Gallus
Comar Health
PubaPinted Ciruits
Cogitel
Fudii-Ka
Galion
Hydrosol Fondations
Interdoern
Media
Pennaflex
SOPAT
SOTUPA
SOVIA
SPG
STI (AanorHotes)
Tecno Catesang
Tunisiel'adoxing
Tunaenn
Tuniar Valersn
Vitalait
MPC Prokim
Medis
Alte Padiaging
Cohigrain
Omniatom
Vitalait
*Amany TiAket irstmert
Ticket Size Year Status Type Stake Deal Value Sector
$5-30nm 2008 Cuent Growth 49% NA Con es Goods
(Hyg1enic1%odnar)
$5-30m 2003 Exited Growth NA NA Agribusiness
$10-15m 2006 Cunent LMBO NA c $10m Industrials (Parkaging)
NA 2007 Curent IPO NA NA Divenrihed
NA 2007 Cument Growth 0.51 51%*6 Industrials (Electro-
TND 3m Medranin)
EU5-15m 2011 Cunent Growth NA NA Phamoeutials
EUR 5-15m 2009 Curent Growth NA NA Phmaeutidls
EUK5-15m 2009 Cunent Growth NA NA Agausiness
NA 2011 Current Growth NA TND 10m Healthcare
NA 2008 Cunent Growth 19% NA
Electronics
$0.9m* 1998 Exited Growth NA $1.9m Industdals (Padaging)
50,9m* 1999 Current Growth NA NA Textile
$0.9m* 2000 Exited Buyout NA NA Industrials (Plastic
Containes)
$0.9g'* 1997 Cunent Growth NA NA Servies(Soil Studies)
$0.9m* 1996 Exited VC NA NA Phanuaticob
(Vetefinary)
S0.9m* 1996 Current VC NA NA Phaonnentinls
ECP
ECP
Swimrp
Antis
North Afiti
Holding
Abtaaj
Abraaj
Abraaj
IFC
IFC
Tuninvest-
Afintinvest
Tuninvest-
Afin ret
Tuninvest-
Afainanvest
Tuninvest-
Afrindnvest
Tuninvest-
Affincinvest
Tuninvest-
Tuninvest-
Afrincinvest
Tuninvest-
Aforoduvear
Tuninvest-
Afadiauvest
Tuninvest-
Afftinavest
Tuninvest-
Afdaddavest
Tuninvest-
Afineinvest
Tuninvest-
Affindnvest
Tuninvest-
Affinanvest
Tuninvest-
Tuninvest-
Afsindovest
Tuninvet-
Affincnvvst
Tuninvest-
Afinaonvest
Tuninrest-
Affincirvest
Tunanvest-
Affinduveir
Tunuscest-
Affindonvest
Tunitavet-
Aflintinvest
Tunisvest-
Afrinoinvest
ECP Afic Fund 1l PCC, ECP
MENA Growth Fund I.C
ECP MENA Growth Fund LLC
Intaj Capital
Canada Investment Pund for Afdcam
NA
The Kantam Fund
The Kantan Fund
The Karntaus Fund
NA
NA
Tuninvest International Ltd
Tuninvest International Ltd
Tuninvest International lid
Tuninvest IntenationaliLd
Tuninvest International Ltd
Tuninvest IntenationaldM
Tuninvest Intemrational Ltd
TuninvestInternational Ltd
Tuninvest Intemational Ltd
Tuninvest International Ltd
Tuninvest Intermational Ltd
TuninvestIntenational Ltd
Tunmvest International Ltd
TuninvestIntenationalLtd
Tuninvest Intenational Ltd
TuninvestIntemationsl Ltd
Maghreb Private Equity Fund I
Maghreb Private Equity Fund I
Maghreb Private Equity Fund II
Maghreb Private Equity Fund II
Maghreb Private Equity Fund 11
Maghreb Private Equity Fond U
Afaicinvest ltd I
2006
After
2006
2008
2000
2000
Current
Exited
Current
Exited
Exited
Exited
Exited
Exited
Exited
Exited
Current
Buyout
Growth
Growth
VC
Growth
Growth
Growth
VC
Growth
Growth
Growth
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
45%
NA
NA
NA
NA
N5A
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
Current VC NA NA
Current
Cunent
Current
Exited
Exited
Growth
Growth
Growth
Growth
Growth
31%
NA
0.3
45%
45%
$19.5m
NA
NA
NA
NA
Consumer Goods
(Bedding Produrts)
Agnusiness
Phanneaeutrals (Cotton
& Bondage)
Aguibusiness
IT, Telemnm &
Electronic
Hotls/Laisute
Servies (Catering)
FinnalServies
Fianial Services
Agibusiness
Industdals (Resin)
Pharmaeuticls
Industrials (Padraging)
Agribusiness
IT, Telecm &
Electronics
Agaibusines
Agribusiness
Soun-e: Public information available on thefunds' websites, press
Most managing companies of offshore PE funds cited above have offices in Tunisia with
local teams in charge of sourcing and managing PE deals in the country. Those fund managers
represent the Tunisian community of PE professionals who meet private equity global standards.
As opposed to domestic PE funds (SICARs and FCPRs), the typical GP-LP relationship and a
real team dynamics are in place. Even though they target higher ticket sizes than domestic funds
(between TND 5-20 million versus generally less than TND 1 million for domestic funds), the
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Table 2.4:
$0.9m* NA
$0.9m* 1995
$09m* 1998
S0.9m* 1997
50.9m* 2000
$0-9m* 2001
$0.9m* 1999
$0,9m* 1998
50.9m* 1998
$.mA* 2000
AfterEUlR. 
.8m 2000
EUR 1.8m 1996
EUR 2-15m
EUR 2-15m
EUR 2-15m
EUR 2-15m
EUR 0.
7
5-3m
bias introduced by fiscal incentives targeting domestic PE funds and the practice of carrying
agreements infringes to some extent on the deal flow of offshore PE funds.
3) From Fundraising to Exit: The Private Equity Lifecycle in Tunisia
As discussed in the precedent part, the lifecycle of domestic PE funds is flawed from the
outset mainly because the GP-LP relationship and their investment approach do not meet the
industry standards. However, managers of offshore funds with a presence in Tunisia represent
the "real" community of PE professionals in the country and have a great role to play in
professionalizing the industry. That is why I will try to explain several features of the private
equity lifecycle in Tunisia by focusing on offshore funds instead of domestic PE funds (see
difference in lifecycle in Figure 2.9 below). More specifically, the analysis will cover the four main
areas of the lifecycle: the fundraising phase, the investment period, the holding period and the
exit of investments.
Figure 2.9:
Lifecycle of a Standard PE Fund
Fundraising
(12-18 months)
Fund's Operations
(10-13 yearS)
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doI Jq."d 6on
I istributm I
I folding
Period
I ,4
Lifeccle of a Typical SICAR
* Fund Setup
(<I year)
Fund's Operations
(Indem're Period)
*Often tax-driven and at the initiative of one or several "LPs"
*Before the promulgation of statutory laws 99 &100 in October 2011 All capital sibsctibed should be called up-front
Lifecycle of a Typical FCPR
Fund Setup
(<lyear)
Fund's Operations
(10-12.ears)
Often tax-driven and at the initiative of one or several "LiPs"
*Used to be 1-2 veam before the promulgation of statutory laws 99 &100 on October 25, 2011. Usually all capital subscribed is called up-front
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A) The Ftundraising Phase
A KgRioial Pripctivc
Whereas domestic PE funds are typically set up at the initiative of one or several "LPs",
managers of regional PE funds (with a presence in Tunisia) pitch global and regional institutions
and try to persuade them to commit capital. The latter also often work with placement agents
whose job is to find potential LPs.
Yet, fund managers agree that the rationale for raising funds from international and large LPs
in order to target exclusively Tunisia is weak. The main issue is indeed the size and the scalability
as certain macro indicators show (Table 2.5). The economy is small and potential to grow is
limited as compared to other emerging market because of the limited size of addressable market
as well as a less hot economy (slower growth rates). The direct consequence is that PE capital
needed in Tunisia is limited (relatively to the size of commitments made by international LPs).
Table 2.5:
Macro Highlights on Tunisia
Total Population in 2010 (Million) 10.5 Million
Population CAGR 2005-2010 (%) 1.0%
GDP in 2010 (Current USD) $44.3 Billion
GDP/Capita PPP in 2010 (Current USD) $9,550
Real GDP CAGR 2005-2010 (%) 4.7%
Real GDP CAGR 2008-2010 (%) 3.4%
Soune: World Bank, IMF
Moreover, for several reasons (to be developed later), fund managers looking for a certain
range of ticket sizes (higher than the one sought by domestic PE fund managers) face some
hurdles to generate deals. The combined effect of the small ticket sizes, the limited scalabilitv of
companies and the difficulty to generate deals, drives down the total "reasonable" size of a fund
potentially focusing on Tunisia. In addition, LPs have a minimum commitment amount as part of
their investment policy; a certain number of them (especially large public and private pension
funds, and asset managers) would not be interested in committing capital. According to one of
my interlocutors, a large pension fund such as the American Calpers would never accept to
commit less than $10 million because they have some fixed transaction costs they need to cover.
The rationale for raising an offshore fund focusing specifically on Tunisia is even more negatively
impacted. Therefore, in all cases (except for Tuninvest's first offshore fund, Tuninvest
International Ltd) Tunisia is typically part of a broader regional focus (Middle East & North
Africa, North Africa, the Mediterranean area, the African continent). Therefore, it is essential to
understand the dynamics of the "regional" fundraising since it has a direct impact on the activity
of offshore funds in Tunisia.
Tunisia captures a (small) piece of offshore funds' investments focusing on two main areas:
the MENA region and the African continent. At this stage, it is important to notice that funds
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invested in "Africa" refer, most of the time, to funds invested in Sub-Saharan Africa. While
Tunisia is not part of Sub-Saharan Africa, the development of private equity in this region has at
least indirect impacts on the PE activity in Tunisia: some fund managers focusing more on Sub-
Saharan Africa might be willing to access the North African market; there are already some pan-
African funds (such as ECP, Actis, Tuninvest-Africivest) who have investments in both North
Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa; some funds can take advantage of the potential integration,
complementarities and similarities between the two regions by expanding portfolio companies
beyond their domestic market.
The MENA region and Sub-Saharan Africa are experiencing a different dynamics in
fundraising activity. As displayed in Figure 2.10, fundraising in MENA boomed between 2005
and 2008 and represented on average 9.8% of the total yearly fundraising in the emerging
markets. During this period, the fundraising level in MENA was well above the level in Sub-
Saharan Africa (on average 4.0% of total fundraising in emerging markets during the same
period). However, they both dropped at almost the same level in 2009 and the trend
tremendously reversed in 2010-2011 with fund managers focusing on Sub-Saharan Africa raising
approximately 3 times more capital than those focusing on MENA. Therefore, while Tunisia is
usually considered as being part of North Africa and more largely the MENA region, the
increasing PE activity in Sub-Saharan Africa which contrasts with a significant slowdown in
MENA might relatively increase the importance of PE developments in Sub-Saharan Africa for
Tunisia.
Figure 2.10:
Private Equity Fundraising: Sub-Saharan Africa vs. MENA
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DFIs play a very important role in developing private equity in Africa trough the capital they
contribute as LPs. According to a research conducted by Preqin, 51 DFIs actively invest in
private equity funds focusing on the African continent (9% of LPs investing in the region).
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However, this statistics underestimates their role: several fund managers surveyed by Monitor
suggest that the contribution of DFIs is above 50 / of the total commitments in value"1.
The example of Tuninvest-Africinvest Group supports this consideration: as displayed in the
diagram below (Figure 2.11), 8 out of its 10 "main" sponsors are DFIs. The most important
source of funds for Tuninvest-Africinvest comes from bilateral DFIs, which represent a group of
financial institutions set up by some European countries whose aim is to help private equity
funds and financial institutions in emerging markets raise funds (example: Netherland's FMO,
France's AFD, Belgium's BIO, Finland's Finnfund, Switzerland's SIFEM). Other DFIs are
regional (African Development Bank, European Investment Bank) or multilateral (World Bank's
IFC).
Figure 2.11:
Breakdown of Tuninvest-Africinvest's "main" LPs per Type
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According to one of my interlocutors from Tuninvest-Africinvest, "PE firms in Africa only
exist because of DFIs' willingness to develop "poor" countries". However, according to his
experience, even though most of private investors do not look at the region (in the best case it is
considered as a "frontier market"), more and more are now willing to take it into consideration
and are asking PE fund managers to send documentation. While they first concentrated their
African commitments on PE funds focused on South Africa (between 2008 and 2010, 57% of
the total invested capital was captured by South Africa2 s), LPs are now more interested in the
continent as a whole. As a matter of fact, in a survey conducted by Coller Capital in 2011, 44% of
the global LPs interviewed said that they saw Africa as an attractive investment region while they
were only 21% to say so in 2010. They seem in this regards to be more convinced by some
"pitching" arguments since the crisis: the continent's economic health has a limited correlation
with the rest of the world and shows great growth perspectives (c. 5% p.a.) when the developed
world is facing recession, IRRs above 15% can be delivered without leverage (thanks to growth
potential), people are more and more educated, the middle class population is expanding (good
proxy for market size, especially for consumer goods). Even though cost of doing business is
higher than in developed markets (inefficient infrastructure, difficulty to recruit talent, need for
imports, etc.), fund managers notice that corruption and fraud are often well overstated.
27 Monitor, "Private Equity in the Shadow of Giants", 2011
28 Jeune Afrique, Nr. 2649, 16-22 October 2011
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T un1isia aj Par of the All N- - Region
LPs investing in the MENA region are mainly driven by three factors29: macroeconomic
outlook, demographic change and portfolio diversification. As displayed by Table 2.6, the MENA
region offers attractive macroeconomic and demographic fundamentals while allowing at the
same LPs to be exposed to 12 politically and economically diverse countries with great
integration potential.
Table 2.6:
Macroeconomic and Demographic Highlights on MENA
Number of Countries 12
GDP in 2010 (Current USD) $1.4 Trillion
Expected GDP in 2015 (Current USD) $2.3Trillioa
GDP Growth Rate in 2010E (%) 5.1%
Population below the Age of 30 (%) 57%
GDP per Capita in the GCC (Current USD) $25,000
GDPper Capita in the Rest of MENA $10,000
Source: PEI Researh, 'The Final Frontier An Investor Perception Anapsis of MENA Private Equi4", November 2010
In MENA, fund managers have mainly sought to raise capital from domestic investors (e.g.
family offices, big corporations) and governments (sovereign funds). While the boom of PE in
the region in the early 2000s resulted in an unprecedented expansion of the number of funds,
many of them blew up during the global financial crisis. According to one of my interlocutors at
Swicorp, several reasons explain the vulnerability of those funds:
- Some of them have overpaid assets due to a competitive environment and a bubble in
valuation levels, which generated significant losses once the bubble burst.
- Some fund managers did not manage to raise new capital for new funds because of a
weak track record.
- LPs have become much less keen to (re-)invest; some of them have defaulted during the
crisis. Liquidity is much more important for corporations and high net worth individuals:
they are not as reliable as institutional investors and are often not keen to reinvest in
future funds. In fact, most of them do not have a real investment strategy with clear
allocations in the different asset classes.
- Some LPs did not honor their commitments and defaulted with their GPs because they
lost money in 2008-2009. In developed markets, GPs would typically have gone to court
as LPs breached a contractual agreement. However, this did not happen in MENA for
three reasons: the legal framework is not sophisticated enough; it is not rare to have
"close relationships" with investors; the fund managers do not want to tarnish their image
among the community
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While the region captured a significant share of the capital committed to EM PE fund
managers prior to the crisis thanks to the huge amount of cash held by domestic investors, it is
now considered as the "final frontier" in terms of commitments. Domestic investors are less
keen (or capable) to pour capital into private equity in the region for the reasons stated above but
also because they are now expanding their geographic scope (BRICs and Sub-Saharan Africa): it
becomes even more important for fund managers in MENA to attract capital from international
institutions. However, according to a survey conducted by PEI Media", the mean allocation for
MENA as a percentage of total PE allocations (within the sample of LPs interviewed) was only
1.0% in 2010 and was expected to increase to 1.6% in 2012 (versus 3.2% in 2010 and 3.7% in
2012 for Sub-Saharan Africa). According to EMPEA (Figure 2.12), there are three important
factors (more than 30% of the respondents) which would deter LPs from starting to invest in the
MENA region over the next two years: the limited number of GPs, the limited scale of
opportunities (relatively small amount of capital needed) and the political risk. It is worthwhile to
note that the survey was conducted between December 2010 and January 2011 and might
therefore underestimate the importance of political risk.
Figur 2.12:
Factors Likely to Deter LPs From Beginning to Invest in
MENA Over the Next 2 Years
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The survey conducted by PEI Research" also shows that track record is of utmost
importance (the most important factor LPs would consider when evaluating MENA GPs
according to the survey). We previously discussed that first-time funds in emerging markets
performed quite well and that such data should ease the difficulty first-time fund managers are
facing to raise money in a currently strained environment. According to Hassan Assad, Chief
Investment Officer of the private equity and investment funds at the IFC, investments in MENA
(which total 5.5% of IFC's PE allocation, i.e. $150 million) have performed well (around 20%
IRR) with a significant share of first-time funds being successful'. However, paradoxically,
according to the overall sample of LPs interviewed by PEI Research, doors for first-time fund
2 PEI Research, "The Final Frontier: An Investor Perception Analysis of MENA Private Equity", November
2010
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managers are expected to be closed in most cases and the standard of due diligence are expected
to be very high. According to one of my interlocutors from Swicorp, one explanation of such
skepticism among international LPs is the lack of good track record in the region. There have not
been enough exits (and even less good exits since 2008) to convince LPs about the attractiveness
of PE in the region.
Within the MENA region, the share of North Africa excluding Egypt (Morocco, Algeria,
Tunisia, and Libya) is small: most of investments are concentrated in the GCC countries and
Egypt. According to EMPEA, of the $3.0 billion invested in the region, $2.2 (i.e. almost % of the
total investments) benefited only to Egypt and UAE. While Morocco captured $64m, offshore
funds focusing on MENA have made very few investments in Tunisia.
13) The Investment Period
bisitmen T pes
While venture capital represents a significant share of domestic PE funds' activity, growth
capital constitutes by far the major portion of offshore funds' investments in Tunisia. As a matter
of fact, based on the data provided by ATIC for domestic funds and the data I collected in Table
2.4 for offshore funds, 42% of domestic funds' transactions in 2010 were VC-type transactions
while only 13% of offshore funds' transactions (to date) are considered as such - mainly
Tuninvest's first international fund - (Figure 2.13). Growth capital, however, represents almost
3/4 of offshore funds' transactions to date versus 2 for domestic PE funds in 2010. It is
worthwhile to notice that domestic funds' share of growth capital investments increased over the
past few years as funds raised and ticket sizes expanded; according to ATIC, growth capital
represented only 4 0% of domestic funds' investments in 2008 versus 60% for venture capital. As
previously discussed, the activity of SICARs and FCRPs in VC and growth capital often does not
meet standards in developed markets.
Figure 2.13:
Local PE Funds: Breakdown of Deals by Type (2010) Offshore PE Funds: Breakdown of Deals by Type (to
Date)
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Early stage investment
While there are significant opportunities in early stage investments, the ecosystem around
entrepreneurship is still relatively weak. Offshore funds are generally not interested in VC-type
transactions because they look for transactions with higher tickets and companies with a proven
track record. Domestic VC funds often act like debtors in the sense that they require from the
entrepreneur to buy back the injected capital according to a certain schedule. At the same time,
they rarely play the role of VC investors: they often neither incentivize the entrepreneurs to
develop their company and create value nor advise them on how to do so. As I previously
developed, this is partly due to the fact that domestic fund managers have no experience in
venture capital (or private equity in general) and cannot bring as much value as typical VC
managers in developed markets would. There are some business angels who invest their own
money along with entrepreneurs for very early-stage investments (seed investments). Such
investments are generally plain vanilla equity and reflect more business angels' willingness to help
entrepreneurs and promising projects rather than formal and sophisticated transaction processes.
However, a "premise" of an ecosystem around entrepreneurship and venture capital showed
up recently. The first private incubator initiated by Mondher Khanfir in 2011, Wiki Startup, now
provides entrepreneurs with a full range of services as per developed markets' standards: the
incubator intends to help entrepreneurs accelerate the different stages of creation with advice
covering ideas, business plans, fundraising and access to market. Not only the incubator can help
entrepreneurs refine their ideas and host them, but it is also able to support them in defining a
fundraising strategy and give them access to a network of potential investors. The business model
can also be flexible as contracts can be structured around "success fees" instead of "fixed fees"
when the amount becomes unbearable by the entrepreneur and the managers of the incubator see
a strong potential in the project. In the same year, Maher Kallel launched the "Carthage Business
Angels" association whose intend is to gather the community of Tunisian business angels and
offer a platform whereby entrepreneurs can meet potential investors. It is also important to note
that such structures not only share information about entrepreneurial projects but also cooperate
in order to educate the community of entrepreneurs. According to a number of my interlocutors,
it is fundamental to develop and reinforce the entrepreneurial culture among potential Tunisian
entrepreneurs and investors. In this regards, events are organized by the different members of the
ecosystem in order to attract, inform and educate both entrepreneurs and investors. For example,
Wiki Startup, Carthage Business Angels and the Mediterranean School of Business successfully
organized altogether an event around "Raising Funds from International Venture Capitalists" in
December 2011. This type of events and symposiums is a strong tool to enrich and strengthen
the entrepreneurial ecosystem. The event quoted above had two positive effects. First, it helped
Tunisian entrepreneurs and venture capitalists to have a better understanding of the expectations
and standards of international venture capitalists. Second, it provides a good example of how
Tunisian entrepreneurship can be promoted and introduced to international investors.
- Growth capital
Fund managers involved in growth capital private equity targets medium-sized company
which needs capital to finance future growth. Growth capital constitutes the bulk of PE
investments in emerging markets due to a combination of economic and demographic factors.
The most important of them are reasonable demographic and GDP growths, low penetration
rates in certain sectors, a strong increase in the middle-class and the GDP/Capita, a change in
consumption habits, a potential expansion of local products and services via the replacement of
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imports or the increase in exports. Investors consider that the risk-reward profile of such
investments is attractive because the can generate attractive returns without any leverage.
The need for growth capital private equity is particularly relevant in Tunisia as 90% of total
companies are SMEs". However, the size of potential PE investments is limited because the
companies typically look for small amount of capital (between $3-4 million). This is more what
the PE jargon would call "small cap" investments rather than "mid-cap" investments. This size
of investments corresponds more to VC-type financing in developed markets. Consequently,
average ticket sizes of PE investments in Tunisia are unusually low. I derived the average ticket
size of later-stage investments made by offshore funds in Tunisia (to date) based on the data
gathered in Table 2.4 and some estimates I made. As displayed in Figure 2.14, it is equal to $6.5
million when I include Tuninvest's first international fund (Tuninvest International Ltd) and
$11.2 million when I exclude it from the sample. I benchmarked this data to the average ticket
size in MENA, Sub-Saharan Africa and emerging markets as a whole, and it appears indeed that
PE tickets in Tunisia are well below the average elsewhere (the average ticket size over 2008-2011
is $42 million in MENA, $33 million in Sub-Saharan Africa and $40 million in emerging markets).
The fact that ticket sizes are so small in Tunisia mirrors the difficulty that offshore funds face to
source deals meeting their ticket size range (typically $10-20 million).
Figure 2.14:
Benchmark of Tunisian Average PE Ticket Size (USD Million)*
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Moreover, the small size of the Tunisian market (10.5 million inhabitants) and the relatively
low GDP growth rate compared to other countries in the region constitute real limits in terms of
scalability of consumer-oriented businesses. In order to generate attractive growth rates, fund
0 IFC, "Union of Arab Banks Help Small Businesses in Maghreb Access Credit", Tunis, 5-April-2012
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ma
managers need to invest in considerably underpenetrated consumer good businesses. Other
potential growth-type investments are businesses with a significant potential for exports or with a
B2B business model.
According to one of my interlocutors from Swicorp, companies which have the potential to
absorb higher ticket investments do exist but they generally do not see any advantage to open
their capital to PE investors. First, those companies are generally owned by one or several
families and are reluctant to the idea of giving up part of the ownership. Second, most of them
have plenty of liquidity; they have enough internally generated cash flows and easy access to
banks' financing in order to carry on investments. The only reason they usually see to open their
capital structure is to bring in a strategic investor who can contribute a technological asset, a
certain type of know-how or any kind of strategic partnership which adds value in business terms
(e.g. Delice's shareholders which opened 50% of the company's capital to Danone in 1997).
- Other types of investments
Buyout transactions in Tunisia (and more generally in MENA and Africa) are rare for several
reasons. First, a large number of companies are family-run businesses and shareholders do not
wish to exit when the company is profitable. Moreover, top managers are often the founders
themselves or have at least a close relationship with initial shareholders. As the market for
management talents is limited and private equity investors consider that a good management is
the most important criterion, most of the transactions are minority investments. Therefore, most
companies left for buyouts are either in a distressed situation or are in a phase of
intergenerational transition whereby the new generation of the family is willing to exit (the latter
is rare though). Second, constraints on majority stakes for foreign investors (offshore funds are
considered as so) and on domestic funds make it difficult to implement buyout transactions.
Offshore fund managers need a special authorization from the Central Bank in order to buy a
majority stake in a Tunisian company. Even when fund managers find a way to structure a
buyout, it is very difficult to put some leverage and get acquisition financing. Banks are indeed
used to require tangible assets as collateral. In addition, leveraged buyouts typically target mature
companies with a very stable cash-flow profile, which is rare in the country. Finally, in some
countries which provide a very attractive corporate taxation (example the UAE where there is no
corporate tax), the rationale for leverage is weakened since there is no value creation through
interest tax shields. Nevertheless, the latter statement does not stand for Tunisia since the
marginal corporate tax rate is 30% (which offers potential incentives to raise debt in order to take
advantage of interest tax shields).
Even though LBO-type transactions are very rare in Tunisia, it is not impossible to put a low
level of leverage. Such transactions require an extra-effort from the fund managers (and
potentially the CEO or CFO of the target company) in terms of negotiation and education of
banks about this type of financing (e.g. Swicorp's investment in Altea Packaging). The level of
debt would remain relatively low compared to the "mega" leveraged buyouts taking place in the
US or in Europe. Typically, debt would represent 20-30% of the total capital structure or 1.5x
EBITDA and would help optimize IRR and make companies more disciplined in order to cover
interest payments and pay back the principal. For such levels of leverage, acquisition debt would
typically cost TMM+1.5% (the TMM is the average monthly rate of money market fixed by the
Central Bank). As the TMM is currently low (3.5% versus more than 5% prior to 2009), there is a
window of cheap acquisition financing for LBO transactions should PE investors and managers
be able to convince banks to lend. Nevertheless, fund managers need to carefully assess the risk
related to this type of transactions and question whether it is an acceptable structure given the
cash flow profile of the target company.
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Distressed and turnaround investments are almost inexistent in Tunisia. The Investment
Code used to encourage them through fiscal incentives (included in the list prior to the two
statutory laws promulgated in October 2011) but the rationale for this type of investments is
limited for three main reasons: current fund managers have little expertise in this area of private
equity as it is very different from growth capital PE; the regulatory framework is not
sophisticated enough to enable investments in distressed situations; distressed companies often
suffer from a "bad" management and as previously developed, PE professionals give a great
importance to the quality of the managers in place since it is difficult to replace them.
Finally, private equity funds could act as platforms for industry consolidation and asset swaps
through "sell-off' transactions (also called "asset sales"). Some "large" holding companies or
groups (e.g. Poulina Group Holding, Groupe Elloumi, Groupe Loukil, Groupe Bayahi, Groupe
Kallel, etc.) often own assets in very diverse sectors. In this regards, private equity firms could
play the role of platforms by buying similar businesses from holding companies willing to divest
part of their assets. Acting as industry consolidators would enable PE fund managers to create
value through potential synergies. They could also create a platform for asset swaps between the
holding companies and participate indirectly to industry consolidation. They could indeed take
advantage of the fact that such conglomerates see each others as "competitors" and rarely
consider M&A transactions between themselves. However, such strategies are faced with two
main hurdles. First, most families behind those holding companies are unwilling to streamline
their business and focus on their core competencies rather than managing a "portfolio" of
unrelated assets. Second, it is not an easy task to integrate entities used to different corporate
cultures and management styles.
ecorAlttierieess
None of the offshore PE funds investing in Tunisia has a sector focus. Even though there is
not enough data to derive a hierarchy of sectors, it is worthwhile to analyze offshore funds'
investments in Tunisia per sector and compare the results to the current trends in the MENA
region (Figure 2.15).
Investments in industrials and manufacturing (to date) are clearly preeminent in Tunisia (30%
of the deals to date). It is also the case for the MENA region as a whole: the number of
investments in this sector in 2009 and 2010 represent 19% of total investments. Investments in
Tunisian companies playing in the industrials and manufacturing sector is mainly driven by the
competitiveness of labor (relatively cheap and qualified), the existence of fast-growing and at least
partly export-oriented companies, the capacity to reach a potentially large market (domestic and
foreign consumers, "big" clients in B2B businesses), the expertise developed by a number of
companies in their main line of business (e.g. packaging, plastic containers, electro-mechanical
products, textile, hygienic products, etc.).
With 20% of PB investments in Tunisia to date, the agribusiness sector also offers great
opportunities for growth equity. Tunisia is indeed famous for several high-quality products (olive
oil, citrus fruits, dates, tuna, etc.) and there are plenty of opportunities to invest in the whole
value chain of agribusiness: from exploitation to distribution, not to mention the full range of
services gravitating around agribusiness (soil studies, fertilizers, supply chain optimization, etc.).
The potential for growth is primarily driven by the proximity of important markets for exports
(European Union, Middle-Eastern countries) as well as the room for modernization in
agricultural practices. On the contrary, the agribusiness does not show up as one of the most
important destination of PE capital in the MENA region as a whole. Arable land in GCC
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countries (which capture most of PE deals) is indeed very poor (agriculture represents 0-4% of
GDP versus over 10% for Tunisia). Yet, they are very rich in natural resources (notably oil and
gas), which explains the high share of energy and natural resources in PE investments targeting
the MENA region.
The partial liberalization of the pharmaceutical sector in 1989 entailed the emergence of many
players and the rise of interest of international pharmaceutical companies in Tunisia. Even
though the market is still controlled and regulated by the "PCT' (Pharmacie Centrale de Tunisie,
a state agency), the sector has experienced strong growth reflected by an intensification in the
production of generic drugs (40% of total production") and the significant development of
license agreements with large international pharmaceutical companies (Glaxo-Smithkline, Sanofi-
Aventis, Merck, Astrazeneca, Pierre Fabre, etc.) under which Tunisian companies produce,
market and sell (either domestically or for exports) products "owned" by these large international
companies. The growth of this sector is mainly driven by the competitiveness of labor relatively
cheap and highly skilled. Offshore PE funds showed interest in a number of valuable assets in the
pharmaceutical sector with a strong potential for growth (e.g. Abraaj in Opalia Pharma, Unimed,
Tuninvest in Medis, etc.).
There is also a real potential in the technology sector (mainly ITC, Telecom & Electronics)
either for the domestic market (as a replacement for "imported" technologies) or for exports.
Some PE investments such as the IFC in Fuba Printed Circuit, Tuninvest in SPG and Omniacom
reflect the strong belief in the growth potential of Tunisian companies involved in this sector.
Figure 2.15:
Offshore Funds' Investments in Tunisia: Breakdown per Sector (to Date)
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PE Investments in MENA: Breakdown per Sector (2009-2010)
14% a Industn'als & Manufacturing
19%/
0 Technology
1n%/ Energy & Natural Resources
U Banking & Financial Services
18%
10% U Media & Telecom
M Infrastructure
M Others
Source: EMPEA
The absence of PE investments in infrastructure is appealing but it is mostly due to the fact
that infrastructure is considered as another asset class. In more developed markets, funds
investing in infrastructure have usually a specific focus on infrastructure because it is a different
type of investment (the maturity is longer, the ticket size is generally higher, the risk/reward
profile is different). However, there is a clear need to develop "hard" infrastructure (roads,
highways, power, water, etc.) as well as "social" infrastructure (schools, hospitals, etc.) in inland
areas. Public-private partnerships between the government and potential private funds investing
in infrastructure could be a good way to develop investments in this area as it would bring an
additional source of capital and a more efficient "private" management style. Moreover,
infrastructure investments would have an indirect impact on growth capital PE as improved
distribution channels and more generally a better equipped environment (notably in the inland
areas) would improve even more the growth potential of Tunisian companies.
Several sectors are "protected" from foreign investments. As offshore funds have their
capital denominated in a foreign currency, they are considered as foreign investors and are unable
to invest in sectors such as distribution and real estate. They are also faced with more indirect
issues related to sector protection. Foreign investors are for instance not allowed to possess
agricultural lands while many factories are typically built on those lands.
Investment Critena
Private equity fund managers mainly look at three criteria when they consider investing in a
Tunisian company.
First, the management needs to be "good". "Good" does not necessarily mean world-class
management but good enough to manage growth once the PE fund becomes a shareholder,
understand their market, seize opportunities and manage crises. The CEO of a target company is
typically the founder or a member of the founding family: the performance and the image of the
company are often tight to the quality of his management. That is why PE funds often make
minority investments and keep the management in place. Buyouts with a change of the
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management team are riskier and difficult to implement (the market for talents is not large
enough).
Second, the management also needs to be cooperative enough to work along with the fund
managers in transforming the company. For example, many companies are not "clean" in terms
of declaring employees to authorities, accounting and internal reporting; the management should
be open to improve practices and corporate governance.
Third, fund managers seek companies which "do well" and have a strong business model but
still provide some room for value creation. Typically, fund managers look into the competitive
positioning and strategy of the company (business lines and products, market share, type of
customers, providers, distribution channels, etc.), its cash flow profile (especially the way it
generates revenues and its cost structure), and even more importantly the prospects for value
creation either in terms of top-line growth (for example by selling new products, reaching new
clients, expanding in other countries) or margin expansion (for example by optimizing the cost
structure, reorganizing the business to increase efficiency).
eal Souring Process
In order to generate deals, fund managers often need to look for potential targets themselves.
There is generally no investment bank involved in the screening process as it can be the case in
more developed markets. Fund managers are not actively "pitched" by investment banks to give
them ideas of potential acquisitions. Most of the deals are generated on a proprietary basis and
bidding processes are not the standard. According to my interlocutors, the main way to increase
the deal flow is a "hands-on" approach. It is essential for fund managers to expand their network
of key shareholders and CEOs in potential target companies. From a practical standpoint, they
usually need to continuously meet and talk about potential opportunities with "businessmen"
they know. In order to expand their set of potential targets, they also often need to go through
national databases and seek for example companies with more than 50 employees; then, they try
to meet with CEOs and/or key shareholders in order to educate them about potential
"partnerships".
The education of companies' managers and shareholders is a key element of deal sourcing. It
comes with active deal sourcing attempts. At the early stages of the relationship between the fund
managers and the CEO/shareholders of the target company, it is often difficult to convince them
about the rationale for partnering with a PE fund. As a matter of fact, companies' managers and
shareholders often have a negative view on the constraints underlying PE funds' investments.
First, private equity capital is much more expensive than a typical bank loan (cost of equity
typically ranging from 15-30% versus 6-8% for a bank loan). Second, shareholders lose full
ownership and control of the company while PE investors seek to protect themselves with
negative covenants in shareholder agreements (especially in minority investments), which is
culturally difficult to accept for family-run businesses. Third, PE professionals impose more
costly but lawful practices when it is necessary (such as declaring all employees and avoiding
fraud with tax authorities) as well as a "cleaner" accounting and a better internal reporting. More
particularly, it is not rare to see negative shareholders' equity in companies' balance sheet because
some managers (often owners) consider that the company's cash is their own money and
therefore take out all the cash flows generated from the company's treasury for personal use.
While an improvement in corporate governance and transparency is crucial for PE investors in
the sense that it limits risks of fraud and potential downside risks at exit, companies' managers
often consider the status quo as more convenient.
71
Moreover, companies' managers and shareholders rarely see the value added of PE investors:
they often consider them only as a more expensive and much more constraining source of
financing than banks. That is why it is more than crucial for fund managers to educate managers
and shareholders about the basic rationale for PE investment. PE fund managers typically market
their investments around the fact that they are not passive and "rigid" investors like banks. They
require a higher return essentially because their equity investment is more at risk than banks'
loans: they share the upside with the owners but also the downside. They are also active investors
in order to make sure that their capital is efficiently put into work. Based on their past experience
and expertise, PE fund managers usually support companies with strategic thinking, resource
allocation, corporate governance and transparency, improvement of internal processes and capital
structure optimization. However, it is not easy for companies' managers and shareholders to
acknowledge these benefits; all fund managers agree that a good track record and especially
success stories are essential. Concrete examples of successful partnerships in Tunisia would
indeed make it easier for PE fund managers to market the rationale for private equity investments
and would therefore improve the deal flow.
PE fund managers have noticed that CEOs and shareholders of potential target companies
(more particularly "big" groups) have been more open to potential private equity investments
since the Arab Spring; deals in the pipeline meeting their ticket size target have notably increased.
This window opened mainly because companies have been fraught with several uncertainties:
- Uncertainty over the evolution of the political and social climate in Tunisia
- Uncertainty over growth prospects in the domestic market
- Uncertainty about banks' willingness to lend
- Uncertainty about the future of Algeria and the risks around instability in Libya
- Uncertainty about spillover effects of the European crisis and its impact on exports
and/or potential write-offs due to unpaid products or services
Therefore, the value-added of collaborating with PE funds in this uncertain environment
seems to make more sense from the target companies' perspective. PE fund managers could
provide financial support whilst helping companies to operate a strategic shift and/or manage
potential crises. Big groups also might be more willing to divest some of their uncorrelated
businesses in order to get more liquidity in a context of cash-strapped environment.
- Valuation Levels
PE professionals in the MENA region agree that valuation levels were overall excessive
before 2008 and did not reflect the economic reality. Stephen Murphy, Managing Director at
Citadel Capital, notes in this regard: "in 2007-08, valuation expectations [in the region] were
excessive, driven by abundant liquidity and overly optimistic end-market expectations. We were
uncomfortable with market conditions at the time, and did not invest. The global crisis, however,
put an end to this market dynamic. Valuations are more reasonable and business owners have
adjusted their expectations. We are now seeing more interesting investment opportunities."3 2
However, the Arab spring does not seem to have uniformly brought valuations down and many
PE players believe that valuation levels are still too high. As a matter of fact, Sherif Elkholy,
Director at Actis, provides an interesting view: "The story of bargain hunting and doing deals at
32 PricewaterhouseCoopers, "The Next Five Years, MENA PE", September 2011
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very low prices at the time of crisis is theoretical. When cataclysmic events happen, the spread
between buyers and sellers' price expectations actually gets wider. Take Egypt today for instance,
vendors continue to think highly of their business and want to hold on to pre-revolution
valuations. On the buyers' side, even if views on the growth of companies' earnings remained
unchanged, equity risk premiums have changed. CDS spreads in the country have increased and
ratings in the market are lower in terms of multiple. As a result, the gap between buyers and
vendors' expectations has widened and a very limited number of deals will likely take place." 2
In the region as a whole, fund managers have the sentiment that the Arab spring has not
made valuation levels more in line with downside risks. However, in the case of Tunisia,
companies' managers and shareholders seem to be more aware of the uncertainties and risks
implied by the current instability according to my interlocutors. Deals in the pipeline have
increased since summer 2011 as target companies not only see more rationale for partnering with
PE funds but are also uncomfortable with the current "risk-on" environment. Such gap with the
overall dynamics in the region can be explained by the fact that one of the main drivers of PE
investments in Tunisia was the historically more stable political, regulatory and social
environments as compared to other countries. Therefore, when combined to the increased
demand for PE capital, the alteration of the "country" risk has naturally driven valuation levels
down.
According to one of my interlocutors at Swicorp, EBITDA multiples for deals currently in
the pipeline are around 5-6x in terms of EBITDA multiple and 8-10x in terms of P/E multiple as
compared to 7-8x EBITDA multiple and 10-12x P/E multiple three years ago. Even before the
Arab spring, the Tunisian market was viewed as being less expensive than other countries in the
region. As a benchmark, Morocco is considered to be much more expensive; multiples in
Morocco are manifestly higher: EBITDA multiples stand at 10-12x while P/E multiples are
around 16-18x P/E (and can go up to 20-25x on certain deals, for instance in the insurance
sector). This is driven by several factors: the high level of funds ready to be invested, the higher
number of PE actors increasing competitiveness on deals, the higher share of bidding processes
versus exclusive deals (target companies have more systematically recourse to investment banks),
and a more developed stock market increasing the expected valuations at exit.
- Valuation Methods
PE fund managers have recourse to the usual valuation tools (discounted cash flows or
"DCF", multiple-based approach, "VC" method).
- Discounted cash flows:
o Future cash flows of the target company are forecasted within a certain time
horizon and they are inflated at a perpetual growth rate starting from the final
year of the forecasting period (typically the inflation rate)
o The cash flows are discounted to their present value using the weighted average
cost of capital ("WACC")
" WACC = Cost of Equity * Equity Value/Enterprise Value + After-Tax
Cost of Debt * Debt Value/Enterprise Value
= Cost of Equity = Risk-Free Rate + Beta of the Company * Market Risk
Premium (Capital asset pricing model, or "CAPM")
= The risk-free rate is typically the rate of a long-term Tunisian treasury
bond (c. 6%)
" The equity market premium used is the premium of the stock market over
the risk-free rate (6-8%)
73
" The beta of the company is generally based on the average beta derived
from a set of publicly traded comparable companies
o However, there are several challenges encountered by PE professionals when
using the DCF method:
" Using the Tunisian treasury bonds as a risk-free rate is not accurate since it
is not reasonable to consider such securities as "risk-free" (Tunisian
treasury bonds are currently rated BBB-)
" The market risk premium is biased by the inefficiency of the Tunisian
stock market
* The number of companies listed in the Tunisian stock market is very
limited (only 59 listed companies) and some sectors are under-represented
or not represented at all, which makes it difficult to derive reliable betas.
Betas are consequently often drawn from "comparable" companies in
foreign markets and might not reflect the systematic risk bared by a
Tunisian target company
" In some cases, the discount rate is adjusted for "country risk" but most of
the time this approach is "fudgy"; it is more preferable to reflect such
risks in projected cash flows from a conceptual standpoint (country risk is
mostly idiosyncratic)
Multiple-based valuation:
o A multiple-based approach can either be based on traded comparable companies
or comparable transaction multiples
o Typically, PE professionals look for listed companies with a similar activity or
comparable transactions in the same sector and derive multiples such as
Enterprise Value/EBITDA, Enterprise Value/EBIT, price to earnings ratio
(P/E), price to book ratio and other "accounting" multiples. Then, they apply
such multiples to the corresponding accounting aggregate of the target company
o There are also several challenges in this case:
" The limited number of Tunisian companies listed in the stock market
significantly reduces the set of comparable companies and looking for
companies traded in foreign stock markets generally introduces a bias
* There is little disclosure of transactions (especially for PE deals), which
limits the use of comparable transactions
* The multiples usually used often reflect the competitiveness in the deal
market rather than a "fair" valuation
"VC" method:
o Cash Flows and "accounting aggregates" are forecasted over the expected holding
period
o A multiple-based approach is used to forecast the valuation upon exit
o The exit value is "discounted to present" using a target IRR (typically 20- 30%) in
order to obtain the present value of the company (from the PE fund managers'
perspective) and define the entry stake
o This method is not exempt from multiple challenges:
" The exit multiples are even more difficult to assess than entry multiples in
the multiple-based valuation as more complexity is introduced by the
evolution of the overall multiple levels and the industry cycles. It is not an
easy to "market time"
" Discount rates used are much higher than the equity cost of capital for
three main reasons:
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" Investments are illiquid and cannot be traded on the stock market
(PE professionals often use a liquidity discount of 20-30%)
" PE professionals consider that they add value to portfolio
companies and factor their service in the price as they spend a
large amount of time monitoring portfolio companies and bring a
reputation capital, access to skilled managers and industry contacts
(but why not simply compensate them for their services?)
" PE fund managers discount idiosyncratic risk and optimistic cash
flow forecasts (while it is more accurate to build uncertainty into
the cash flow estimates)
Table 2.7 displays a simple
methods commonly used by PE
Table 2.7:
Valuation Methodology - Illustration
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Excel model illustrating the mechanics of the three valuation
professionals.
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Risk Assessment
The Arab spring has brought more attention to the risk assessment of investment
opportunities in the region. While risk assessment used to be more focused on the business risk,
a survey conducted by PvC32 shows that 53% of the GPs interviewed in the survey would give
more importance to the assessment of political risk and would toughen the due diligence process
before taking any investment decision. Theoretically, this kind of risk (for example the risk of
expropriation or a sudden increase in tax rates) is most likely idiosyncratic and diversified away by
well-diversified investors (namely the LPs). However, this does not mean that GPs should not
care about political risks when they make investment decisions: they rather need to consider them
as idiosyncratic risks and treat them as so in their valuation exercise. It is common to see
investors add fudge factors in discount rates, which is often incorrect and introduces a bias".
Such risks need more careful judgment in cash flow projections even though estimating their
impact is not an easy task because of their unpredictability and their non linear impacts. Another
layer of complexity is added once we assume that investors are not necessarily rational. As a
matter of fact, investors' increased focus on political risks since the Arab spring suggests that the
availability heuristic might be at stake. As it is indeed difficult to estimate the impact of
unpredictable political events on valuations, investors could tend to underestimate political risk
when the environment observed is stable whereas they might be tempted to overestimate it once
it materializes (e.g. the Arab spring).
The survey conducted by PwC also suggests that GPs in the MENA region will give more
importance to macroeconomic risks such as inflation, currency depreciation and interest rate
changes. GPs need to make a distinction between the idiosyncratic component (for example the
risk of social movements following the Arab spring) and the systematic component (which
reflects the correlation of the target company's performance to the overall economy) of the risk
underlying their investments. While the former needs to be reflected in cash flow estimates, the
latter is reflected in the cost of capital through the beta estimate. For example, let us assume that
a Tunisian company "X" exports phosphate to big multinational clients. The revenue stream is
secured by long-term contracts in USD. Such company would likely have a low beta: an
economic recession in Tunisia should not affect its cash flow stream. However, social unrest and
strikes would have a direct impact on its cash flows as they might prevent the company from
honoring its contracts.
At the fund's level, currency moves can be an important concern. Offshore funds are
denominated in "reserves" currencies such as USD and Euro. Therefore, currency moves can
have a significant impact on the cash flowing to LPs; the difference between IRRs in domestic
currency and IRRs in USD or Euro can be dramatic. For example, let us suppose that fund "A"
denominated in Euro invests in a company "X" a certain amount in Tunisian Dinars. "A" would
need to call Euro capital from its LPs and convert it in Tunisian Dinars. If the Tunisian balance
of payments becomes under pressure due to a deterioration of the economic climate, the Central
Bank might be forced to devalue the Tunisian Dinar. In such scenario, the fmal cash flows
flowing to the fund would be worth less in Euro amounts and the IRR in Euro would be lower
than the IRR in Tunisian Dinars due to the currency exposure. Whenever there is a timing gap
between inflows and outflows, the fund's capital is subject to a currency exposure (another
scenario for example is the time difference between the date at which fund managers seal a deal
in Tunisian Dinars and the date at which they call the capital in Euro to make the payment). In
such context, currency hedging is relevant but there are two main hurdles. First, the cash flows
33 Brealey, Myers, and Allen, "Principles of Corporate Finance"
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(drawdowns as well as distributions) are uncertain both in terms of size and timing", which
makes a currency strategy at the fund level useless. However, fund managers have more visibility
on cash flows generated by their portfolio companies and currency strategies might be
implemented at this level. However, hedging tools are often very limited in emerging markets
(particularly in Tunisia) and priced expensively. Fund managers consequently accept to be
exposed to currency moves and commonly take speculative positions. They might factor in such
uncertainty in their USD or Euro cash flow predictions but such exercise needs a lot of judgment
call about macroeconomic prospects and is often difficult to implement during the negotiations
with target companies about the valuation. Raising money from domestic investors would help
GPs to cancel out currency exposure but there are many disadvantages and constraints in raising
TND-denominated funds as previously discussed.
DealtructresNCgotitionl andE/ecuio
Since most transactions are minority investments, PE fund managers seek to get some
protections partly offsetting their lack of control. In developed markets, they typically use
customized financial instruments and put in place several covenants in the shareholder agreement
in order to do so.
- Financial Instruments Used in Deal Structures
In order to protect themselves from a "take-the-money-and-run" scenario whereby selling
shareholders would pull out the money before creating any value or sell too early, PE fund
managers (especially those investing in relatively early stage company) typically need to protect
themselves by creating shares with an embedded liquidation preference. There are several
instruments used in the world of "sophisticated" VC and PE fund managers. The most important
of them are detailed below.
- Redeemable preferred (or straight preferred) embed a mandatory redemption right which
allows the investors to force liquidity event and prevent a "life-style company". It also
specifies when it must be redeemed. When the company cannot redeem at the pre-agreed
price, penalties can kick in (for example increased board seats). Dividends on those shares
accrue and are typically paid upon redemption. Should the company be liquidated at a
value lower than the face value, the investors would capture 100% of the final cash flows.
However, they are not convertible into common stock. Figure 2.16 displays the payoff of
a TND 1.0 million straight preferred.
3 Peter Cornelius, "International Investments in Private Equity"
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Payoff to
PE Fund
TND 1.0m
0
Straight Preferred - Proceeds
Flowing to PE Fund
V: Liquidation Value
FV: Face Value of Preferred
FV V
More commonly, VC and PE investors have recourse to preferred shares packaged with
common stock. Such instruments provide a downside protection for investors but also an
upside potential. Once the fair value of the company surpasses the face value of the
preferred share, investors would be entitled to get x% of the company in common stock.
Figure 2.17 displays the payoff of a TND 1.0 million preferred packaged with 30% of
common stock.
Figure 2.17:
Preferred Packaged with Common
Stock - Proceeds Flowing to PE Fund
V: Liquidation Value
FV': Face Value of Preferred
FV V
- Convertible preferred shares are the most commonly used instruments by venture
capitalists'. They can be converted at the shareholders' option into common stock at a
pre-specified conversion price. They typically convert if the total value obtained upon the
liquidation event is greater than the liquidation preference with accrued dividends. There
3s Yaron Leitner, "Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance", 2009
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Figure 2.16:
Payoff to
PE Fund
TND 1.0m
0
I
is also often an automatic conversion upon liquidation provided the proceeds are high
enough. For example, if the initial investment is TND 1.0 million and the conversion
price is TND 10 per share, the convertible preferred can be converted into 100,000
common shares. Assuming there are initially 100,000 shares, the PE fund would own
50% of the common shares and the conversion would kick in if the value of the company
upon liquidation is greater than TND 1.0m/50% = TND 2.0 million (ignoring accrued
dividends). Figure 2.18 displays the mechanics of this example.
Figure 2.18:
Convertible Preferred - Proceeds
Payoff to Flowing to PE Fund
PE Fund
| Slope =0.5 |
Slope 1 V: Liquidation Value
FV: Face Value of Preferred
CV: Min. Enterprise Value at Conversion
TND 1.0m
0 FV CV=
TND 2.0m
- PE investors can also have recourse to participating convertible preferred, that is to say
convertible preferred with an extra feature: "in the event of liquidation or sale" (that is to
say not an IPO), the holder gets the face value and an equity participation. In the case of
a liquidation or private sale, this instrument has the same features as a preferred packaged
with common stock whereas it has the same characteristics as a convertible preferred in
the case of an IPO.
The role of preferred shares is fundamental in PE and VC investments as they align
incentives of existing shareholders, the managers in the company and fund managers to strive for
large payoffs whilst protecting PE or VC investors in the case of a downside scenario. The
instruments used will largely depend on the negotiation process and the willingness of investors
to incentivize existing shareholders and managers.
The Tunisian regulatory framework allows only a limited recourse to the financial instruments
discussed. PE investors typically use plain vanilla equity and to some extent convertible
instruments as regulators do allow the recourse to convertible debt. Convertible debt is very
similar to convertible preferred. There are some differences though: convertible preferred is
commonly treated as equity from an accounting perspective, it may be a perpetual security, and
the company is not under any legal obligation to pay dividends on preferred stock. Even though
the absence of convertible preferred can be replaced by convertible debt, the main hurdle is the
limit of 30% of the total capital set by the regulators. Offshore funds can also be challenged by
the Central Bank in converting their convertible debt in case they increase their ownership above
the threshold of 5 0% (the investors would need to get a special authorization from the Central
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Bank). Regulators do authorize preferred dividend stock but such instruments are also limited to
30% of the total capital, do not entitle their owners to any voting right and more importantly do
not provide any liquidation preference.
PE professionals agree that the regulatory framework needs to become more flexible and
provide more freedom to investors in structuring deals. The main underlying issue is that the
current regulatory framework in place is based on the equality of rights embedded by shares: it
does not allow any differentiation among shares as share class differentiation is not authorized.
Tunisia has in this regard a competitive disadvantage when compared to other countries such as
Morocco or many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa where investors have the freedom to structure
deals as they wish. While "anything not forbidden by law is allowed" in those countries,
"anything not explicitly allowed by law is forbidden" in Tunisia. However, according to some of
my interlocutors, PE professionals are trying to lobby in order to make things change (notably
through the association of PE professionals, the ATIC). Should the regulatory framework evolve,
there would also be a need to educate companies' shareholders and managers about the benefits
provided by those instruments (it is already difficult to generate investments in plain vanilla
equity).
- Contractual Protections and Negotiations
PE and VC fund managers typically negotiate with the target company's shareholders a
number of contractual clauses in order to protect themselves. The most important clauses are
detailed below.
- Representations and warranties: a series of statements in the acquisition contract
confirming several facts on the target company. They typically state the following: the
target has no liabilities not shown on its balance sheet, financial statements are accurate,
assets are in good condition, the target has committed no violations of law or
governmental regulation, etc.
- Anti-dilution provisions: such provisions intend to protect the PE or VC fund from
"down" rounds of financing whereby the target would raise additional equity funding at a
price below the price negotiated by the fund managers. The conversion price of the
fund's convertible preferred shares is lowered either to the price of the new financing
("full-ratchet anti-dilution") or based on a weighted average calculation (proportional
price and equity protection, "weighted average anti-dilution").
- Right of first refusal: the PE or VC fund has priority over third parties if existing
shareholders want to exit. In other words, if the existing shareholders find a potential
buyer, they need to propose the same transaction to the PE fund; they would be able to
sell to the third party only if the PE fund representatives do not exercise their right of
first refusal.
- Preemptive rights: give the right to PE or VC investors to buy new shares offered by the
target company in later financing rounds.
- Board representation: PE or VC investors require board seats (typically one or two in a
board of 5 directors).
- Protective provisions (class voting rights): the approval of preferred shareholders is
required for several decisions. Examples of such decisions are: the sale, merger or
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liquidation of the company, changes in corporate charters, major acquisitions or budget
changes, appointment or termination of a CEO. Such provisions allow investors to
prevent any action by the management that would materially change the business risk of
the company.
- Performance contingencies: such clauses tie the valuation of the target company to
performance. Some aspects of the contract and/or the valuation are contingent on
financial and non-financial performance measures. Examples of performance
contingencies are: additional funding or share vesting conditional on completing a new
benchmark, more voting control to the fund representatives if the EBIT is below a
certain threshold, earn-out structure (the seller receives additional compensation if some
financial goals are achieved)
- Tag-along or co-sale rights: if an offer is made for one of the shareholders' shares, that
offer must be extended to other shareholders (namely the PE or VC investors). This
situation is especially important in the case one of the founders exits as tag-along rights
allow investors to exit at the same time and price.
- Drag-along rights: right to force shareholders to sell the company upon board and
majority shareholder approval. Those rights intend to protect a majority block of
shareholders from minority shareholders if an opportunity occurs (whereby the new
buyer would typically ask for 100% of the total shares).
Offshore funds also use the typical clauses above when they invest along with Tunisian
companies but some adjustments need to be made. The most important difference is the
impossibility to create a different class of shares (in this case convertible preferred). Such
difference has two main implications. First, anti-dilution provisions need to be negotiated on the
basis of common equity rather than the conversion price of preferred stock. Second, as the
companies are not authorized to issue shares with preferential voting rights, protective provisions
cannot be implemented as they are in typical term sheets (that is to say giving veto rights to
preferred shareholders). Yet, this restriction can be circumvented as it is possible to give veto
rights for certain shareholders on well-defined and specific matters (business plan approval,
external growth decision, agreements with related parties, appointment or termination of a CEO,
etc.).
An arbitration clause is also often added to PE deals in Tunisia: PE professionals estimate
that Tunisian judges are not familiar enough with PE term sheets or M&A agreements in general
and would like to avoid "bad" decisions due to a misunderstanding of agreements in case of
litigation. That is why they prefer courts of arbitration over Tunisian courts. In this case, private
judges would make the decision and a Tunisian court would (easily) execute it. However, PE fund
managers go very little to courts and prefer compromises not to ruin their reputation and image
(which would negatively impact their ability to generate deals in the future). The term sheet (or
shareholder agreement) provides some level of protection to PE investors in the sense that it
serves as a basis for negotiation in case of litigation.
More importantly, the main hurdle encountered by offshore fund managers in Tunisia is the
difficulty they have to explain and negotiate such clauses. Most of the target companies are
family-run businesses (first to second generation of owners) not very familiar with "sophisticated
finance" (managers typically see their bankers as the unique financing option) and M&A
transactions. According to my interlocutors, pushing them to open their capital structure is
already a very difficult task. Many deals would fall apart at the negotiation stage because the
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sellers are often not willing to make concessions on the different clauses (right of first refusal,
preemptive rights, tag-along, drag-along, veto rights, performance contingencies, etc.) while being
"poorly" advised by lawyers not familiar with PE and M&A transactions. It often takes time for
sellers to see that such contractual agreements are the norm and are necessary to seal a deal.
While closing transactions is of course preferable, "failed" transactions at least contribute to
educating shareholders and managers about deal making with PE funds.
- Deal Execution
According to PE professionals investing in Tunisia, it generally takes relatively more time to
execute "small" deals in Tunisia (when compared to other more developed markets).
Transactions typically take between 6 months and one year to be implemented. The difficulty to
quickly execute transactions is due to a combination of factors.
- As previously discussed, negotiating the clauses of a typical term sheet is not an easy task
because companies' managers and shareholders are not used to such transactions and are
often advised by lawyers without any expertise in M&A.
- Sellers are rarely advised by investment banks, which makes the deal making process even
slower. Sellers and managers need to take care of the entire process themselves while they
have little or no experience in M&A.
- Due diligence can take a very long time. Financial statements are often not "clean" and
need to be amended, in many cases there is no information available except for financial
statements (relevant information would need to be collected from scratch) while a lack of
transparence and a poor corporate governance need to be clarified.
- Sellers commonly have neither a solid business plan nor a clear strategy. PE professionals
need to build a detailed BP along with the target's managers in order to be able to value
the company.
- In order to (legally) circumvent the Tunisian regulatory constraints, PE professionals
often need to put in place complex structures for acquisition purposes along with their
legal advisors. There are often multiple vehicles in different countries and Tunisian shell
corporations created ex nihilo to circumvent investment limitations and optimize fiscal
structure. At the same time, the transaction structure submitted to the Tunisian regulators
needs to be "simple". Buyouts are particularly difficult to implement because foreign
entities (in particular offshore funds) need to ask for a special authorization in order to
take a majority stake.
Besides, PE professionals use almost exclusively internal resources to manage deal
executions. Typically, there is no investment bank involved in the process, the valuation is
performed internally, most of the due diligence is processed by internal professionals (sometimes
legal or accounting firms are hired to provide an opinion but internal professionals usually have
control over the process). The recourse to external resources may vary from a PE firm to another
but the cost can be non trivial (relatively to the small investment tickets) especially if the service
providers are located in developed markets. Managers in Tuninvest-Africinvest for example built
up a good understanding of term sheets through their deal experience; they now draft most of
their term sheets internally.
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C The I loldmg Period
PE professionals investing in Tunisia agree that they have a very "hands-on" approach in
their monitoring of portfolio companies. Private equity investors in Tunisia not only play a role in
financing companies but also act like consultants and help managers in taking key decisions.
There are essentially two levers used by PE professionals in order to increase value in their
portfolio companies: improvement of corporate governance as well as strategic and operational
help.
E n Ihanamlentl of Corporate Governamce
Prior to the entry of a private equity fund in the capital of a Tunisian company, corporate
governance is often very weak. Typically, roles and responsibilities of shareholders and managers
are not well defined; the limit between the company's treasury and shareholders' personal
expenses is vague; internal processes are flawed; transparency and ethical behavior are blurry.
Improving corporate governance is always a priority for PE fund managers when they invest in
Tunisian companies. First, it helps them protect their best interest and have a clear view on the
company's management and activity. Second, it enhances value creation through the
improvement of the internal organization and the decision-making process. Third, it helps with
exit through IPO or private sale in the sense that it makes the due diligence process much more
straightforward and increase the valuation upon exit (lower downside risks for the potential
buyer).
As they are often minority investors, private equity professionals need to make sure that their
interest is well represented. In order to do so, they require one or several seats on the board of
directors. They also often bring independent directors to avoid any conflict of interest and
strengthen the independence of the board. They also commonly set up a strategic committee to
improve communication with and between shareholders and managers. Such a committee plays a
fundamental role in decision-making as the PE fund's representatives can formally advise
founders and key people from the management on strategic decisions. Even though the strategic
committee's members do not have any executive power, they help the board of directors and
managers take acute decisions.
The clarification of roles and responsibilities is a second area of improvement. Private equity
professionals see it as an essential step towards a better-working organizational structure. The
roles and responsibilities of the different stakeholders (founders, other shareholders, managers at
the different levels of the company) need to be precisely defined in order to provide each of them
with a level of accountability and avoid any conflict of interest.
The institutionalization of portfolio companies also comes with the enhancement of
disclosure and transparency. Internal control and reporting are improved and provide tools for
shareholders and board members to have a better view on the company's activity, adjust
processes accordingly, and take fact-based decisions. Regular internal control, auditing and
reporting are meant to improve the performance of the management as they intend to check
whether pre-set objectives (essentially through budget and planning) are met. They also help
shareholders to ensure that procedures are performed as intended (more specifically integrity and
ethical behavior).
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Stratgic aumd Operati'onal I le/p
Better internal processes and reporting not only intend to bring more transparency and
improve disclosure but they are also essential to improve operations. Budgeting, planning and
analytical accounting often contribute to understanding and analyzing in a more structured way
the operational strengths and weaknesses of the portfolio company.
An example given by one of my interlocutors at Swicorp provides a good illustration of the
value that can be created through such basic tools. Even though the company in question,
Stepevi, is Turkish, the take-away can be transposed to Tunisian PE-backed companies as the
investment pattern is often very similar. When Swicorp became a shareholder of the carpet
manufacturer and retailer in January 2009, Stepevi had 28 outlets selling carpets and was overall
profitable. Once Swicorp's representatives put in place analytical accounting (initially existent), it
turned out that (roughly) half of the outlets were losing money. Without implementing any
structured analysis of revenues and costs, the management used to think that closing some of the
outlets would result in a loss of revenues. The results derived from analytical accounting revealed
that their carpet business was not a "proximity" business since people were ready to drive 10-
15km more to buy high-quality carpets. The introduction of analytical accounting materially
improved efficiency as EBITDA increased by 20%.
Improving internal processes and reorganizing portfolio companies are only one part of PE
professionals' contribution. Regular discussions are typically conducted along with key managers
and shareholders in order to help with defining a clear business strategy and improving
operations based on a thorough analysis of the company's competitive positioning and internal
organization. There are several levers they can use to create more value.
One of the most important lever is to help the company scale up and use the PE capital
injected to grow (most of the time organically). Top-line growth often comes with increasing
market reach or diversifying products. The way growth strategy is implemented obviously
depends on the sector and the company itself. There is no general rule but it is worthwhile to
detail some of the options. Distribution capacity often constitutes a limit to manufacturing
companies which aim to expand their market reach: due to a lack of large and efficient
distributors in Tunisia, they typically need to have their own float to distribute manufactured
products to their customers. The capital injected can also simply be used to increase- production
capacity (capital expenditures) or develop new products. PE professionals can leverage their
contacts and network as well (possibly in other portfolio companies) in order to increase the
customer base (notably in B2B or service-based businesses). When the company is or becomes a
leader in its market and have opportunities to expand in other countries, the PE fund
representatives can play a crucial role in helping it expand in markets where the rules of the game
can be different (cf. "Focus on Regional Expansion" below).
PE professionals also often seek to improve the cost structure in order to improve profit
margins. There is also no general rule in this case but cost structure rationalization often
translates into streamlining business units, allocating resources in a more efficient way and
improving the bargaining power with providers (concomitantly to the growth of the company).
Headcount cuts are rare but they can be necessary when the "surplus" of headcount cannot be
"recycled" within the company. In fact, as PE investments are most of the time growth-oriented
they tend to create more jobs within portfolio companies.
Nevertheless, private equity professionals I interviewed make it clear that the implementation
of a pre-determined strategy is not exempt from several hurdles. First, operating strategic shifts
and reorganizing a company used to a family-type management often take time before results
come into fruition. Even though the typical holding period (around five years) might need to be
extended and exit delayed, new investors need to make sure that changes are not implemented
84
too fast not to disturb the company's activity. Second, private equity professionals often have to
deal with internal rigidities specific to family-run businesses and external costs of doing business
(e.g. red tape). Third, the strategic and operational changes initially defined are not set in stone.
Private equity managers need to stay aware of market changes and potential industry reshapes. In
a scenario whereby the change in market conditions implies a significant reshape of the portfolio
company's business, PE investors need to make an extra-effort in terms of communication and
"hands-on" operational help.
In this regard, Tuninvest's investment in IGL provides a good illustration of hurdles PE
investors might face when significant changes reshape a portfolio company's market. When
Tuninvest invested in the company, IGL had a promising business based on PC assembly.
However, the market started undergoing a significant reshape after the investment had been
made. Consumers changed their behavior and progressively started using more laptops than PCs.
Tuninvest's representatives understood that adjusting the whole business model was vital for the
company as the laptops' market share increased from 10% to 30%. This new trend was a major
threat for IGL because laptops were much more complicated to assembly. While Tuninvest's
representatives tried to push hard to switch the business from an assembly-based model to a
distribution-based model, they faced a strong resistance from the founding family. This type of
behavior is typical in family-run businesses as family members are often attached to their
company's brand and model. The problem was solved only when one of the most "refractory"
family members was nominated head of the distribution segment. In order to maximize the
probability of success of this turnaround, one of Tuninvest's representatives undertook a hands-
on approach and personally helped the management with operations. As a matter of fact, he went
to meetings scheduled with managers in international computer manufacturers (e.g. Dell, HP,
Lenovo, etc.) in order to pitch them and have a first-mover advantage over Tunisian competitors.
Focuil on Re6giona/ I 0p1io
Typically, when a company is or becomes a leader in the Tunisian market, managers and
shareholders (among which PE investors) can seriously ponder whether it would make sense for
the company to expand regionally. Regional expansion offers a great option for domestic leaders
to pursue double-digit growth and scale-up to the next level. Depending on the situation, regional
expansion can be fueled either by cross-border acquisitions or by green field projects targeting
new markets. Such strategy makes even more sense for Tunisian companies regarding the small
size of the economy and the limited number of potential customers.
Expanding beyond the Tunisian frontiers is not an easy task though. Starting up a project in a
new country often takes time as managers would need to start everything "from scratch" in a
market they do not know. The rules of the game can be different in many regards: competitive
environment, "administrative" hurdles, market for talents, regulatory framework, unions' power,
procurement, distribution channels, consumer habits, etc. Even though most of those challenges
are also applicable to cross-border acquisitions, when good opportunities are available, regional
build-up through acquisitions has some advantages over starting up a greenfield project. The
access to the new market would essentially be quicker and there would be potential value creation
trough cost (e.g. better bargaining power with providers, overhead, resource sharing, economies
of scale and scope) and revenue synergies (cross-selling, product duplications), technology and
know-how sharing.
Potential candidates for geographic countries are mainly countries in the Mediterranean area
(essentially North African countries, i.e. Morocco, Algeria, Libya and Egypt) as well as countries
in Sub-Saharan Africa. In addition to the difficulties management may face in handling new
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entities operating in structurally different markets, the lack of integration and cooperation among
North African countries, between North Africa and Europe as well as between North Africa and
Sub-Saharan Africa often adds a layer of complexity to implement a regional build-up strategy.
Trade barriers and limits imposed to the circulation of individuals and capital make it more
difficult to manage a regional group. More specifically, capital controls in Tunisia play against
regional expansion of domestic leaders through cross-border acquisitions. In most of the cases,
Tunisian companies need indeed a special authorization from the Central Bank to invest abroad.
This constraint can be a deal breaker as the process takes time (practically three to four months
as Central Bank employees need to review all the negotiation terms, the valuation, etc.) and can
"kill" the momentum needed to close the deal with the foreign company (especially in a
competitive bidding process). Complex legal structures can be put in place in order to facilitate
foreign transactions. For example, the company can create ex-nihilo a holding company in a
fiscally attractive country which can play the role of a platform in the context of cross-border
M&A. Private equity investors can also be very helpful in accelerating the acquisition of foreign
companies as they can take advantage of their USD or Euro-denominated funds to pay for the
acquisition target. Ownership stakes in the holding company and its subsidiaries can be arranged
a posteriori.
Tuninvest-Africinvest and Swicorp's investments in Altea Packaging are very good
illustrations of how PE firms can help Tunisian companies scale up and become regional leaders
through bolt on acquisitions. Altea Packaging (holding company) is a company specialized in
flexible packaging.
The story of Altea Packaging 3 started with the Tunisian company Cogitel, founded in 1984
by a number of industrialists from Sfax, and started its operations in 1987 under the leadership of
Hedi Zeghal (CEO). In 1998, Tuninvest injected capital in the company since the fund managers
viewed the drawbacks experienced by the management in 1997 (closure of the Algerian border)
as a good turnaround investment opportunity. The capital injected by the PE investors helped
the company upscale its operations and improve products quality (ISO certifications). The
company's success in becoming an undisputable leader in the Tunisian market convinced both
Tuninvest and the Zeghal family that it made sense to transform the company into a regional
leader in packaging.
In 2005, the company went through a leveraged management buyout (the first in Tunisia). As
a consequence, Tuninvest partially exited and the Zeghal family increased its stake in the
company (better alignment of management interests and PE investors). In 2006, Tuninvest made
a follow-on investment in a newly created holding company (Altea Packaging) along with
Swicorp. The investment thesis was to use the new holding company as a platform for a growth
strategy mainly fueled by acquisitions. In 2007, the company acquired the French company
Roland and started a greenfield project in Algeria ("Cogitela"). In 2008, Altea Packaging pursued
its rapid growth through the acquisition of the Moroccan company Optima and two Egyptian
companies (Porta and Rotopack). In 2010, Altea Packaging became the leading flexible packaging
manufacturer in MENA, doubled its revenues in five years ($33 million), made significant
efficiency gains (cost savings: energy savings, decline in waste rates, etc.), and expanded its
footprint to five countries (Tunisia, France, Morocco, Algeria, Egypt).
Nevertheless, the success of the company under the investments made by the PE firms does
not hide a couple of drawbacks. While the acquisition of the French company Roland made
theoretically strategic sense (access to the French market and more widely the German, Benelux
and UK markets; leverage Cogitel's expertise to produce semi-finished products and export them
to the French unit), the implementation phase turned out to be much more difficult than
expected. Bad finances showed up, the relationship with suppliers deteriorated, Altea Packaging's
CEO (Slim Zeghal) took over personally the management of the company after having made
36 "Sustainable Case Study: Cogitel (Tunisia)", EMPEA & IFC, 2011
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redundant the manager and the production manager of the French subsidiary. The rules of the
game in the French business were very different with unions showing strong resistance and a
workforce not flexible at all. On the other hand, successive crises (economic crisis in Europe,
violent strikes and sudden interruptions of the production in Tunisia after the revolution) put
even more pressure on cash flow sustainability in a business where operating leverage is high and
margins are low. According to the CEO Slim Zeghal, Swicorp and Tuninvest's managers have
been very supportive along the way.
D) The Exit Phase
There are typically four ways for PE firms to exit their investments: sale back to founders,
private sale (strategic or secondary sale), IPO, leveraged recapitalization. While "leveraged
recaps" (usually debt issuance followed by share buyback triggering a liquidity event) are almost
inexistent, sale back to existing shareholders were historically the most common way to exit
investment in Tunisia. At the same time, private sales are becoming more prevalent and IPOs
more seriously envisaged.
I count 12 exits out of the 30 investments that have been made by offshore funds to date (cf.
Table 2.4). 11 of them are exits from Tuninvest-Africinvest (notably from its first offshore fund
Tuninvest International Ltd). Including investments in Tunisia via SICARs and investments in
other African countries, Tuninvest-Africinvest exited 42 investments out of its 90 total
investments. The breakdown by type of exits is displayed in Figure 2.19. While investments in
other countries than Tunisia are taken into account, the breakdown provides an interesting
dataset regarding the weights of the different types of exits (sale back, strategic sale and MBO
represent almost 3/4). The average holding period is 5 years, and the overall average money
multiple is decent (2.3x)".
Figur 2.19:
Tuninvest-Africinvest: Breakdown by Type of Exits of Pan-African Investments since Inception
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Soune: Tuninvest-Afiinvest's presentation avai/abe on the Afican Development Bank' website, June 2011
3 Tuninvest-Africinvest's presentation available on the African Development Bank's website, June 2011
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Other offshore funds have only exited one investment out of the 10 that have been made to
date (Figure 2.20). Except for ECP's exited investment in Agromed which was made in 2003, all
offshore funds other than Tuninvest-Africinvest (that have been investing PE capital in Tunisia
since 2006-2007) have not made any exit yet. The current turmoil and the subsequent pressure on
valuation levels in Tunisia (and more generally in the MENA region) have delayed potential exits
in the pipeline.
Figure 2.20:
Tuninvest's Offshore Funds in Tunisia: Exits vs.
Current Investments to Date
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Before the first offshore funds started investing in Tunisia, SICARs had popularized exits
through a sale back to the founder(s). Until recently, other types of exits have been very rare for
two main reasons. First, the practice of carrying agreements (which have been widely used by
SICARs) secures the exit at the initiation date of the transaction by forcing the founder(s) to buy
back the shares from the investor according to a pre-determined schedule. Second, the lack of
M&A activity and the limited scale of the equity capital market have constituted severe limits for
a long period.
Private sales can take the form of sales to strategic investors or secondary sales (sales to other
financial sponsors). With more offshore PE funds now investing in Tunisia, secondary sales are
now a more plausible option than a few years ago (Tuninvest-Afrincivest was the only GP
managing offshore funds). As the M&A market is becoming relatively more sophisticated, sales
to strategic investors (either Tunisian or foreign companies) are getting more traction. European
and regional players look indeed for the type of quality assets that private equity investors
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typically nurture. Tuninvest-Africinvest divested in this regards several investments through
strategic sale. Below are two examples of successful strategic sales:
- A stake of 2 9% in Galion (plastic packaging manufacturer) was sold to the Danish
company Superfos in 2008
- A stake of 45% in Vitalait (milk producer) was sold to the Spanish company Kaiku for
EUR 12.8 million
Strategic sales can be negotiated with larger corporations operating in the same general line of
business as the portfolio company. Direct competitors or strategic partners can also have an
interest in buying a PE-backed company. Such companies can see value in portfolio companies
to the extent that the acquisition makes "strategic sense": revenue and cost synergies, geographic
diversification, business diversification or industry consolidation, technology transfer. Strategic
buyers are also often appreciated by existing shareholders in the sense that they can bring
"business" value. Typically, the company can hire investment banks to find potential buyers and
handle the sale process but this is not the standard for PE exits in Tunisia. From the PE
investors' perspective, it also provides immediate liquidity (no lockup period such as in an IPO
process). In order to attract more interest from strategic investors, shareholders can opt for a
"dual track" (IPO and strategic sale processes are conducted in the same time).
However, there might be some drawbacks as compared to IPOs. While the price offered is
more attractive than in sale back transactions, it is often lower than the price that PE firms and
initial shareholders can get by listing the company. Managers might also be reluctant to sell the
company when they feel that their position within the company is jeopardized.
Initia/ Public O terin~g
There are several advantages to take a company public:
- Get new capital to sustain growth/improve financial position
- Usually provides a better valuation than private sales
- Greater liquidity for firm's equity
- Potential increase in equity value (initial shareholders can typically benefit from future
upside)
- Diversification of initial shareholders' personal portfolios and easier transfer of ownership
- Secondary offerings which offer initial shareholders the possibility to sell a large portion
of their holdings
- Opportunities for future financing (through seasoned equity offerings)
- Makes mergers and acquisitions easier (more information available to potential buyers,
stock used as a payment currency)
- Better image and visibility
- More efficient employee compensation strategies (stock options, restricted stock awards)
However, IPOs are not exempt from drawbacks:
- Direct and indirect expenses of going public (e.g. broker fees)
- Loss of privacy due to the necessity to release information before and after the IPO
- Costs involved in periodic financial reporting
- Fiduciary responsibility and loss of freedom by management to some degree (monitoring
by board of directors, large outside shareholders)
- Higher risk of loss of control through takeovers (need to retain more than 50%
ownership to maintain control)
- No immediate liquidity through secondary offerings (large shareholders cannot sell their
stock during the "lock-up" period, typically 6 months)
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In developed markets, IPO usually represents the best exit for VC and PE funds whenever
the market is "hot". When the window is open, listing a company generally offers investors the
opportunity to exit at attractive valuation levels. Therefore, the expansion of the Tunisian stock
market is essential to the private equity sector. The public stock market might be considered in
some cases as a potential "competitor" to private equity investors for equity fundraising.
However, most of Tunisian companies which are not ready to go public might see a private
equity investment as a way to strengthen their business and be more ready for an IPO. In
developed markets, academic studies show that there is a correlation between exits and the stock
market (market conditions affect the decision to exit). The concomitant development and
sophistication of the private equity and the stock markets could create a strong positive feedback
loop: private equity exits through IPO would help expand the Tunisian stock market, while from
a long term perspective the development of the stock market could reinforce founders and PE
investors' willingness to exit through IPO.
The stock market in Tunisia is relatively small compared to other countries (Figure 2.21). The
total market capitalization of listed company was TND 14.5 billion by the end of 2011, which
represents only 24% of the total GDP. The Tunisian stock market is still underdeveloped: only
59 companies are listed, the free float capital is low, the IPO market has been historically weak
(on average 3 IPOs per year between 2006 and 2011), volumes traded are very low (TND 10.8
million per day in 2010 and TND 7.1 million in 2011)", many economic sectors are
underrepresented, institutional demand is limited, market inefficiencies are numerous (stocks
cannot fluctuate more than +/- 3% per day, no short-selling allowed, no derivative products,
Tunisian investors' capital "trapped" because of currency controls). The economy is mostly
financed by banks: even in 2009 and 2010 (years of strong activity), the stock market only
represented 6% of private investments' financing.3 9
Figure 2.21:
Total Market Capitalization of Listed Companies as a Percentage of GDP in 2010:
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3 Tunisie Valeurs Report, "Quel Marche pour l'Econoinie de Denain", July 2011
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However, regulators have been pushing to develop the Tunisian stock market and a strong
communication strategy has been undertaken since the revolution. Several measures are under
consideration: push institutional investors to invest in the stock market (pension funds, insurance
companies), lift progressively restrictions on foreign investors, list companies confiscated from
the ex-president and his family, and privatize some of the state-owned companies.
Even though it is still undeveloped, the stock market is already a serious exit options for PE
funds in Tunisia. As the market is still relatively small, there is a high demand for new stocks;
IPOs are typically several times oversubscribed and provide attractive valuation levels. Capital
gains realized via IPO are tax-free whereas they are now taxable for "regular" ways of cession
with the introduction of the two statutory laws in October 2011.
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3. Conclusions and Recommendations
1) Is Tunisia Attractive for PE Investors?
In order to sum up the main factors underlying the attractiveness of Tunisia for private
equity capital, I implement a SWOT analysis (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and
Threats) based on the previous developments.
A) Strengths
- The Tunisian economy is a market-based economy, which creates the basic conditions in
terms of competitive environment, potential for growth, goods markets efficiency and
innovation. Attractive assets with a good management are available for potential private
equity deals.
- Tunisia has an attractive geographic position in the Mediterranean area. This element
constitutes a competitive advantage for potential regional expansions, exporting
companies and funds adopting a regional investment approach.
- Even though the previous government did not manage to tackle internal imbalances
(essentially unemployment), the sound public debt policy (relatively low level of public
debt as a percentage of GDP) gives more room to help the economy reconcile with
growth.
- The regulatory and legal frameworks are perceived as stable and relatively trustworthy (as
compared to other countries in the region). This perception plays an essential role in
terms of foreign capital attractiveness (in particular for offshore private equity funds).
- The fiscal framework is attractive as many fiscal incentives have been established in order
to enhance investments and exports. More particularly, the absence of double taxation is
crucial for foreign investors.
- The availability of a young, skilled, educated but relatively cheap labor can be seen as a
strong competitive advantage (e.g. outsourcing activity, companies seeking organic
growth).
- The presence of "professional" PE investors who are aware of the industry standards and
are contributing to educating owners and managers about private equity investment is a
positive development in the Tunisian market.
B) Weaknesses
- One of the greatest weaknesses of Tunisia from the perspective of PE investors is the
small size of the country. The limited size of the economy, the population and companies
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raises some concerns regarding the potential of the economy to absorb private equity
capital. The low potential for scalability (exacerbated by the relatively low GDP growth
compared to some emerging countries) and the generally small size of investment tickets
remain major obstacles for investors to generate deals meeting their expectations.
The high unemployment rate reflects in particular the inadequacy between supply and
demand in the job market. Despite the availability of skilled labor, such inadequacy might
hinder the growth of potential portfolio companies.
Even though the regulatory and the legal systems are perceived to be "trustworthy"
overall, the lack of clarity remains an important issue. This is particularly the case for the
fiscal system as investors often complain about the comprehensibility of tax rules and
fiscal incentives.
Restrictions on foreign investments raise issues for offshore PE funds (domiciled in
foreign jurisdictions). The problems subsequent to restrictions on foreign investments are
mainly two-fold: first, foreign investors cannot buy a majority stake in a Tunisian
company (unless they get a special authorization from the Central Bank); second, some
areas such as distribution, real estate and agricultural lands (hence, companies owning
plants or other tangible assets based on agricultural lands) are theoretically not accessible
to foreign investors.
Capital controls constitute another regulatory barrier for offshore PE investments.
Foreign capital invested can be "easily" recalled by foreign investors upon exit; dividend
payments and capital gains resulting from an exit can also be up-streamed. However,
regional expansion through cross-border M&A or green field projects in a foreign
country needs the approval of the Central Bank (the process can take several months
before authorization).
The flawed practices of many domestic funds do little to help with a positive
development of the private equity industry in Tunisia. As previously discussed, it is still
common to see aberrant GP-LP relationships, local funds set up exclusively to take
advantage of fiscal incentives, fund managers using carrying agreements and having a
hard time to meet the investment constraints conditioning the fiscal incentives. Despite
some shortfalls, the two statutory laws promulgated in October 2011 show the
authorities' willingness to tackle those issues.
The lack of understanding by companies' managers and shareholders of private equity
investments adds pressure on the deal flow (especially for offshore fund managers). Until
recently, many companies (typically family-run businesses) do not see the value-added of
private equity investors and are reluctant to open their capital. They are even more
skeptical when they discover the negative covenants required by PE investors in proper
shareholder agreements. The rules of the game are also often biased by the overwhelming
presence of debt financing and the "relationship of trust" managers might have with their
bankers.
The lack of sophistication of capital markets and banks can also be seen as an important
hurdle. The limited size of the stock market prevents IPOs from being a "natural" way of
exit or financing. On the other hand, bank financing is often contingent to the availability
of tangible collateral and acquisition debt is not a common practice (which makes
leveraged acquisitions difficult to implement).
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C) Opportunities
The strategic position of Tunisia in the Mediterranean region and the availability of
"quality" companies often focused on their domestic markets create a favorable
environment for potential regional build-ups (regional PE investors would in particularly
contribute their knowledge of foreign markets).
From a top-down perspective, some sectors might be considered as attractive for growth
capital (e.g. pharmaceuticals, industrials and manufacturing, agribusiness, ITC). While
investments depends of course on the quality of target companies, the current position in
the industry cycle of these sectors and the competitive advantages of Tunisia (potential
for exports and outsourcing, skilled but relatively cheap labor, efficiency of the goods
market, etc.) make them attractive for private equity investments focused on growth.
The positive energies recently deployed around venture capital and entrepreneurship also
generate great opportunities for early-stage investments as well as private equity in the
long run (the "new" kind of more sophisticated entrepreneurs who might emerge can
improve deal flow for later-stage investments in the future). Several initiatives undertaken
after the revolution (private incubators, associations of venture capital and angel
investors, events and symposiums dealing with entrepreneurship, etc.) are positively
contributing to the entrepreneurship ecosystem.
In the same way, the positive energies deployed after the revolution create direct
opportunities for later-stage investments. Companies which used to be conservative in
their expenditures under the previous political regime are now more likely to increase
their investments in the future and potentially partner with PE investors in order to do
so.
While the current uncertainty and instability increase the risk of investing in Tunisia,
companies' managers and shareholders are now more willing to discuss potential
opportunities with PE investors and are more sensitive to their value-added.
The uncertainty currently in place also makes valuation levels more attractive for PE
investors, especially compared to those in the neighboring countries (e.g. Morocco).
Potential targets are keener to factor in business and political risks in valuation.
The current economic recession has put banks' balance sheets under stress. As liquidity is
squeezing and non-performing loans are increasing, the contraction of bank financing
might push companies' managers to seek more equity financing.
The high demand for listed companies in a still underdeveloped public stock market
makes the IPO exit somewhat attractive. The prospects of fruitful exits through IPO can
have a positive impact on the deal flow and companies' willingness to open their capital
to PE investors.
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D) Threats
The social instability and the capacity of the government to solve internal imbalances
(notably the high unemployment rate) have adverse consequences on companies'
operations (in particular PE funds' portfolio companies) and investor confidence. The
persistence of instability might delay exits and change the risk/reward profile of PE
investments in the country on the long-run.
The surge in macroeconomic risks also constitutes a major threat. Even though the
government has room for borrowing foreign money, the deepening government budget
deficit and the slowdown in GDP growth have a negative impact on investor confidence.
The European crisis is a serious concern regarding the prospects of exports as Tunisian
exporting companies are often highly exposed to the demand of the European market.
Yet, the negative impact on trade imbalances might be reduced by European companies'
willingness to reduce costs and outsource some of their operations in Tunisia.
The increase in current account deficit also puts pressure on the Tunisian Dinar. The
effect of a potential depreciation can severely impact offshore PE investors' returns in
foreign-denominated currencies.
The activity of offshore PE funds is highly dependent on the regional market conditions
of private equity. The gloomy fundraising prospects in the MENA region might have a
severe impact on offshore PE funds' activity in Tunisia.
I) S\WOT Analysis Sumnmary
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- Potential for regional build up
-Attractive sectors from a top-down perspective
- Positive energies and initiatives around venture
capital and entrepreneurship
- Companies willing eat more after the
political change
- Companies kee s opportunities due to
the current uncertintq7d instability
' Attractive valuation levels
- Less bank financing available, more room for
equity financig
- High demand for IPOs
' Social instability
- Macroeconomic risks
- European crisis and negative impacts on exports
' Potential exchange rate risk
' Dependence on re nal fundraising activity
2) Recommendations and Final Thoughts
As previously discussed, the benefits of private equity for the Tunisian economy are
considerable. The Tunisian authorities and regulators seem to share this opinion as many
initiatives have been undertaken in order to make the industry more dynamic. However, some
flaws in the current system are persistent and need to be tackled.
While Tunisia is perceived as an attractive and competitive country by the investment
community, some structural factors are still fraught with imperfections. One of the most
important key success factors in my sense is the improvement of the regulatory framework for
domestic PE funds. They currently play a major role in the industry and it is of utmost
importance to improve their investment practice.
- Fiscal incentives at entry for local PE funds create a perverse dynamic in fund managers'
investment approach. Many local LPs are indeed incentivized to set up PE funds only to
take advantage of fiscal incentives. The subsequent lack of risk-taking constitutes a major
flaw in the system: investors care more about the fiscal gain up-front rather than the
capital gains made upon exit. Moreover, this type of funds set-up ex-nihilo by local banks,
insurance companies or large groups are often not independent and managed by
professionals who have no experience in private equity (or more generally in deal making
and asset management). I believe that it is essential to withdraw fiscal incentives at entry
as they distort the "rules of the game" and result in flawed GP-LP relationships. Such
step would make investors more incentivized by performance and capital gains (which
obviously needs to be taxed favorably as compared to ordinary income in order to
provide incentives for PE investments).
- The investment constraints imposed to take advantage of the fiscal incentives up-front
(obligation to invest in a limited list of eligible companies) have also deleterious
implications. As a matter of fact, domestic fund managers often need to seal "bad" deals
in order to make sure they respect the investment constraints providing fiscal incentives.
In order to protect themselves from the excessive risk of equity in those cases, they
typically use carrying agreements ("disguised debt"). However, authorities might still want
to encourage certain types of investments (for example in underdeveloped regions). Fiscal
incentives might be granted but it is crucial not to impose any obligation to make such
investments in order to give more freedom to fund managers in defining their investment
strategy. In this case, there would be no obligation for PE professionals to invest a certain
percentage of their funds in a pre-determined catalogue of investments.
- More generally, any type of investment constraints needs to be withdrawn. In this regards,
the two statutory laws soften the investment requirements but are still somewhat
restrictive. For example, they still require that the funds have to be invested within two to
three years after the capital is paid-in. I think it is more suitable to give PE professionals
the freedom to contractually agree with their investors about the investment period, and
more generally about any investment requirement.
- Private equity investors often complain about the lack of clarity regarding tax rules. The
accumulation of "exceptions" in the tax code and changes made over time make it very
hard for them to have a clear view on regulators' expectations. Communication and
interactions between both parties are essential to help overcome the misaligned
understanding of the tax code.
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It is also essential to improve investment conditions for offshore PE funds in order to
increase their deal flow. There are three important considerations to take into account in order to
do so.
- Some of the "protected" sectors (e.g. distribution) need to be progressively made
available for foreign investors (hence, offshore PE funds) to enhance competitiveness,
enlarge the panel of potential targets and avoid any kind of "risky" legal structures aiming
to (legally) "circumvent" the regulation in place.
- Because of their statute of "foreign investors", offshore PE funds cannot buy a majority
stake in target companies (unless they get a special authorization from the Central Bank).
This barrier makes it very difficult to implement buyout transactions.
- Capital controls constitute a significant hindrance for potential regional build-ups. In a
best case scenario, such restrictions on investments made abroad delay transactions and
might "kill" the deal momentum in the context of cross-border M&A. The fact that
offshore funds have foreign-currency denominated money helps companies to avoid
dealing with the Central Bank. Nevertheless, more flexible procedures would clearly
withdraw an additional layer of complexity in deal structures.
While domestic PE funds play an important role in the private equity industry, offshore PE
funds are at least as important. Offshore PE fund managers are indeed the "real" practitioner of
PE investment (as compared to international standards) and they have a great role to play in
educating companies' managers and shareholders. Co-investments along with local PE funds can
also improve the general practice of private equity in the country as they would educate domestic
PE fund managers during "live" deals. Nevertheless, such collaboration might not be possible at
this stage since the gaps in investment practice and objectives in terms of minimum ticket size are
considerable. They can however leverage the existence of associations (e.g. ATIC) in order to
organize symposiums around private equity standards (for example how to properly structure a
deal, how to incentivize selling shareholders and managers, etc.). In the same way, the creation of
a strong ecosystem around entrepreneurship and venture capital (currently in progress) are crucial
for early stage investments as well as private equity investments in the long term.
In addition to fixing the different flaws in the current system, the government also can make
the PE industry more dynamic and efficient through a large public fund. While there were several
attempts to create this kind of funds in the past (e.g. Foprodi which co-invests with domestic
funds in companies meeting the "catalogue" requirements), the results have been disappointing
mainly due to the low risk-taking approach, the lack of managers' skills and the overwhelming
red-tape. A recent proposition made by the Ministry of Finance under the leadership of Jaloul
Ayed (between the up-rising and the election of the Constituent Assembly) provides an
interesting illustration of a potentially efficient implication of the government. Under this
proposition, the government would set up a "large scale investment vehicle aiming to create value
for future generations"'. The target final closing of the fund would be TND 5.0 billion (of which
TND 2.5 billion from privatization receipts of the Tunisian government). Several types of sub-
funds (categorized by asset class such as private equity, real estate, infrastructure, capital markets)
would be created along with private and public investors (local and foreign institutional investors,
sovereign funds, DFIs, etc.). Ajyal Fund's stake in each sub-fund would stand at 25% while 75%
would come from other investors (lever effect of 4.0x). The new equity injected at the level of
companies would help increase their debt capacity (lever effect of 2.Ox on average). The total
* Ajyal Fund, "Tunisian Investment Fund for Future Generations", September 2011
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amount of money that would be injected in the economy would be expected to reach TND 40.0
billion (=5.0*4.0x*2.0x).
I believe this kind of initiatives would help revitalize the private equity sector and the
economy as a whole (Ajyal Fund's objectives: "stimulate investments, notably in rural areas;
encourage entrepreneurship; spur job creation; encourage innovation; accompany the
development of Tunisian companies abroad; reinforce capital structures of promising companies,
notably SMEs; offer alternative financing tools to companies; renew the economic fabric and
favor the emergence of a new class of business people""). The increased private equity activity is
not only meant to spur with the direct effects of investments made by the sub-fund focused on
private equity but also with indirect effects of investments made in other asset classes. In this
regards, the sub-fund dedicated to infrastructure investments is the exact form of "public-private
partnership" that is needed to enhance the quality of infrastructure in the country (notably in
inland areas). While this type of investments has not the same features as typical private equity
investments in terms of lifecycle and returns, the improvement of the country's infrastructure can
dramatically improve the efficiency of companies (e.g. better distribution network) as well as
revitalize inland areas (and make them ultimately more attractive for private equity investments).
The theoretical framework and mechanics of Ajyal Fund are interesting and strong benefits
can be foreseen. Nevertheless, several hurdles might hinder the implementation of the project.
First, a fund of such size and ambition would require a number of skilled managers familiar with
alternative investments and asset management in general. The success of the project is contingent
upon the availability of operational talents. Second, the deal flow is limited in Tunisia and the
capacity of the economy to absorb "effectively" this amount of money can be put into question.
Therefore, I think that Ajyal Fund managers and managers of funds in which Ajyal Fund would
be an LP should have a certain degree of freedom in terms of geographic target. This is especially
important for offshore funds adopting a regional approach: Ajyal Fund would be an LP among
others while Tunisia would be one of those funds' target countries. Ajyal Fund and domestic
fund managers would naturally be more focused on Tunisia but other markets should not only be
screened for potentially attractive transactions but also to ultimately accompany Tunisian
companies in their regional expansion. Finally, Ajyal Fund could have at the same time an "LP"
activity by providing a portion of the capital raised by domestic and regional funds but also a
direct investment arm (in private equity). Should the fund manage to recruit operational talents
with experience in private equity, direct investments can be a powerful tool to co-invest along
with domestic fund managers and help them improve their practice in "live" deals.
According to my interlocutors, there is also a case to make for attracting offshore funds in
Tunisia. Being a platform country for offshore funds would create a whole industry and many
jobs as it is the case for instance in Mauritius. In Mauritius, it is mandatory to have recourse to a
local accountant firm and have a local administrator in place. Offshore funds also generally work
along with local lawyers for administrative procedures. The obligation to open accounts in local
banks improves banks' liquidity and attract foreign capital (even though such capital is more
volatile than DFIs). Authorities typically proceed to a thorough due diligence prior to granting a
license to fund managers and a minimal taxation is in place (low tax rate on revenues other than
capital gains in order not to be considered as a "tax haven"). Mauritius is currently the favorite
jurisdiction for PE funds based in Africa thanks to its straightforward administrative procedures
and legislation regarding the setup of partnerships, the attractive fiscal environment for GPs and
the existence of a skilled local administration. While the example of Mauritius provides a good
illustration of the potential benefits of being a platform country for offshore funds, the decision
of implementing such strategy remains highly political (the economy would need to be much
more open) and would require an exhaustive benchmark of jurisdictions attractive for offshore
funds (e.g. Mauritius, Cayman Islands, Luxembourg, Isle of Man, etc.) in order to define an
optimal positioning for Tunisia. Ajyal Fund can be leveraged in order to give birth to this type of
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industry around offshore funds: as a prerequisite of being a limited partner in regional offshore
funds, Ajval Fund might for example require from GPs to set-up the fund in Tunisia, open local
bank accounts (in foreign currency), have recourse to local accountants and lawyers, recruit a
local administrator.
Finally, the recent political change and the current climate of uncertainty in Tunisia might
entail significant investment opportunities for private equity investors in the short-term.
Nevertheless, the resolution of internal imbalances, social instability and potential
macroeconomic risks are crucial in the long run: the government's ability to tackle those issues
will be decisive for the future developments in the Tunisian private equity industry.
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